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ABSTRACT
The scope of patent claims directed to inventions in the field of pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology has been stumped by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s
recent jurisprudence on 35 U.S.C. § 112. Specifically, the application of a heightened
test for enablement of claims to a genus of compounds with functional limitations or a
genus of therapeutic antibodies, coupled with an increasingly broader application of
the written description doctrine, has resulted in considerable uncertainty in the
biopharmaceutical industry. The Federal Circuit’s shift in interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 112
contravenes the statute and Supreme Court precedent by splitting the singular
standard of § 112(a) into two separate requirements, namely “enablement” and
“written description”, and by going a step further to treat enablement as a question of
law when no such distinction was ever envisaged by Congress or held by the Supreme
Court. This judicially created approach in recent years has set aside over a century of
patent practice to now make it exceedingly difficult to obtain meaningful patent
protection for biopharmaceutical innovations and as a result has impeded investment
and progress for developing lifesaving treatments. This article examines this legal
scheme and highlights why changes to current patent disclosure laws and a return to
a single 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) standard is necessary to avoid disrupting and inhibiting
future innovation in the essential fields of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
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EVISCERATING PATENT SCOPE
SHAHROKH FALATI*
I. INTRODUCTION
A stable patent system is at the heart of how companies in the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries innovate. These companies use patent law, and in
particular genus claims, to make measured judgments when investing to develop and
bring to market groundbreaking pharmaceuticals and therapeutics. Billions of dollars
are necessary to move a novel scientific finding forward to the point of bringing a
product to market.1 Meanwhile, the market for such therapeutics is steadily
expanding. For example, as well as pharmaceuticals, a large percentage of global drug
sales now include biologics such as antibodies. Pharmaceuticals aside, these antibodies
have become the dominant class of new drugs being developed to date, with estimates
that the market for therapeutic antibodies will reach $300 billion by 2025. 2
With such a large market for pharmaceuticals and biologics in the U.S.,
innovators expect robust and predictable patent protection to support their
commercialization strategies. However, based on the Federal Circuit’s increasingly
rigid position when applying certain patent disclosure laws (referred to herein as
Section 112(a)) to genus claims, the stark reality is that many of the existing antibody
and pharmaceutical patents are invalid under current law. Moreover, it is presently
all but impossible to obtain meaningful patent protection to cover pharmaceuticals and
antibodies because the recent interpretation of patent disclosure laws by the Federal
Circuit has all but killed off genus claims.3
Patents promote progress and innovation by financially incentivizing
inventors to innovate by providing them exclusive rights to their discoveries.4 The
public benefits from this system because new technologies are created and
* © ORCID 0000-0001-9427-0762. Director of the Patent Law Clinic and Senior Fellow of the
Innovation Center for Law & Technology at New York Law School. Prof. Falati holds a law degree,
and a doctorate degree in Pharmacology. He has worked with prominent Scientists in the UK and the
US, with his scientific papers appearing in Nature Medicine, Journal of Experimental Medicine, and
in Blood. Prof. Falati has been active exclusively in the IP law field for the past eighteen years in
both academia and private practice. The author declares no conflict of interests and thanks New York
Law School for its support. I am also thankful for advice given by my colleagues, Eamonn Trainor
and Joni Zucker, who made suggestions to early drafts of this piece, as well as to my family and friends
for their love and support.
1 Olivier J Wouters, Martin McKee, & Jeroen Luyten, Estimated Research and Development
Investment Needed to Bring a New Medicine to Market, 2009-2018, 323(9) J. AM. MED. ASS’N 844, 849
(2020); see Thomas Sullivan, A Tough Road: Cost To Develop One New Drug Is $2.6 Billion; Approval
Rate for Drugs Entering Clinical Development is Less Than 12%, POLICY & MED . (Mar. 21, 2019),
https://www.policymed.com/2014/12/a-tough-road-cost-to-develop-one-new-drug-is-26-billionapproval-rate-for-drugs-entering-clinical-de.html.
2 Ruei-Mein Lu, et al., Development of Therapeutic Antibodies for the Treatment of Diseases, 1 J
BIOMED SCI 27, 1 (2020).
3 Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark A. Lemley & Sean B. Seymore, The Death of the Genus Claim, 35 HARV .
J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2021).
4 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1576–80,
1676 (2003).

[21:121:22]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

122

commercialized as a direct result of this financial incentive. This basic quid pro quo of
patent law advances the interests of society. In exchange for an inventor “revealing to
the public the substance of his discovery” so that the public is “enabled without
restriction to practice it and profit by its use,”5 the inventor is provided a period of
exclusivity to stop others from making, using or selling the invention.6 The law is
therefore used to incentivize innovation by restricting certain activities for a limited
period of time in the hopes that this will benefit all of society at a later date.
Thus, patents are central to incentivizing the commercialization of new
technologies and this is foremost visible in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.7 Generally, the value of innovative pharmaceutical and biotechnology
companies is dependent upon the scope of the patent portfolios they own. The scope of
a patent in turn is tied to the breadth of the patent claims it contains, with the
articulation of such patent claims demarcating the boundaries of the patent owner’s
rights.8 Because patent claims are critical to capturing the intellectual property the
inventor considers as her invention, the process of drafting them typically involves
attempting to capture “classes” of items as opposed to narrow specific embodiments of
the discovery. By way of extension, if the scope of the patent claim is narrow, the claims
can be easily designed around to not be infringed. This outcome can be just as bad
where a patent claim is drafted too broadly and is not commensurate with what is
taught in the application. As a result, whether attempting to obtain a U.S. patent at
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office or during patent litigation in courts, examiners
and judges are attuned to patent claims that attempt to capture more than the
inventor has described and taught in the patent application for any given invention.
The scope or breadth of patent claims determine what exactly the inventor is
claiming as her invention. Traditionally, the broader the scope of the claim, the more
disclosure one would be expected to provide to support such a monopoly to a broad
claim in a patent. In this context, the doctrines of enablement and written description
in patent law have been key taskmasters to reflect which patent claims are valid and
supported by relevant disclosures and which fail for being overly broad and not
reflective of the inventor’s disclosure.9
The statutory foundation for determining how much disclosure to include in a
patent application can be found in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), which states:
The specification shall contain a written description of
the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150–51 (1989).
Universal Oil Prods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co., 322 U.S. 471, 484 (1944).
7 Diego Giugni & Valter Giugni, Intellectual Property: a Powerful Tool to Develop Biotech
Research, 3(5) J. MICROB BIOTECHNOL. 493, 498–501 (2010).
8 In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is the claims which define the metes
and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system.”).
9 Id.
5
6
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mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his
invention.
Although there is a well-established statutory framework focusing on the
contours of disclosure required when a patent application is filed, it has been left to
the courts to demarcate the statute’s meaning as to how much and what type of
disclosure is necessary to satisfy this requirement to patentability. In so doing and in
the context of the Supreme Court’s statement that “[t]he object of the statute is to
require the patentee to describe his invention so that others may construct and use it
after the expiration of the patent,”10 appellate courts have interpreted the statute and
developed two related, yet separate, doctrines of “enablement” and “written
description”. However, although the statute at the center of this disclosure
requirement is a short paragraph,11 it has sparked intense debate and disagreement
between judges on the Federal Circuit and District Courts, practitioners and scholars
alike on how these two patent disclosure requirements interplay with each other, ought
to be interpreted and whether the statute requires a single requirement or a dual
disclosure requirement for patentability.12
In this paper, I focus on both the enablement and written description doctrines
of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and seriatim highlight the reasons why the current law pertaining
to enablement and written description is broken and damaging to the
biopharmaceutical industry. The article ends by offering suggestions for correcting the
law’s direction.
It is evident from separate lines of judicial interpretations that there is a split
in how different Federal Circuit opinions pronounce how the statute ought to be
applied. For example, should a single embodiment of an invention be enough to enable
the full scope of a patent claim? Interestingly, despite its deep statutory foundation,
the enablement doctrine interpreting the statute was born in judicial opinions from
the Federal Circuit. Yet, while one line of Federal Circuit cases finds the enablement
requirement is satisfied if the description enables any mode of making and using the
invention,13 another line of decisions finds the opposite, namely, that the enablement
requirement is only satisfied if the specification enables the full scope of the claims.14
These interpretations squarely conflict with each other, as the former rule states that
disclosing one mode satisfies enablement whereas the latter states that it does not.
A second example of this split within the Federal Circuit concerns how should
one apply the separate written description requirement: to police priority as first
intended or to assess if the inventor “possessed” the claimed invention upon filing.
Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Tr. Co., 305 U.S. 47, 57 (1938).
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying
out his invention.”).
12 See Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344, 1361–67 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Rader, J. dissenting in part).
13 Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule,
2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 7 (2009).
14 Automotive Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1379–80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
10
11
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Unlike the enablement doctrine that has deep roots in U.S. law dating back at least to
1832,15 the written description doctrine is a relative newcomer dating back to case law
from the 1970s. And yet, written description only became a significant issue after the
late 1990s when the Federal Circuit used this doctrine to prevent overreaching claims16
and to stop patentees from attempting to claim features of their invention that they
did not have possession of when the patent application was filed.17 As such, whereas
the enablement requirement “helps ensure that a person of ordinary skill in the art
will be able to practice the full scope of the invention,” 18 the written description
requirement’s role has predominantly been to prevent a patentee from claiming more
than the patentee possessed when the patent application was filed.19
In this paper, I first discuss the legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) and
how appellate courts have interpreted the statute over time. Next, this article
introduces genus claims and highlights how critical this type of claim is for developing
meaningful patent protection in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. In
part III, the Federal Circuit’s current position concerning genus claims is analyzed to
show how their present rigid position has made it exceedingly difficult to obtain
valuable patent protection for drugs and biologics within the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries, respectively.20 In part IV, the paper discusses how this recent
jurisprudence has negatively targeted these essential industries much more so than,
for example, the mechanical or electrical industries.
As the plain statutory text of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) shows, genus claims can fall
within the scope of this statute, so long as the claim includes a written description in
“such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same.”21 This fact-intensive inquiry of whether a specification satisfies the disclosure
requirement is for the jury to decide.22 As such, it is for the jury to decide whether a
claim to a genus of compounds, for example, satisfies § 112(a) by assessing whether an
ordinary skilled artisan would appreciate the relevant structural characteristics and
could easily identify the relevant compounds. The concern of the court – to stop broad
claims to nascent, not fully developed inventions – is valid. However, the statute
addresses this concern by allowing factfinders to ultimately decide whether a patent
claim’s breadth is warranted given the level of teaching in the patent application.
As discussed infra in part III, use of genus claiming strategies is at the heart
of pharmaceutical and biotechnology patent law practice. A stable and predictable
patent system is necessary, including predictability in key patent law principals such
as genus claims, to entice the incredibly large financial, time and management
15 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 218, 241–42 (1832) (“The public yields nothing which it has
not agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the
discovery . . .”).
16 Where a patentee can use amendments to the claims to capture more than what is described
in the patent application.
17 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
18 Otherwise referred to as policing priority.
19 Jason Romrell, Biting off More Than You Can Chew: The New Law of Enablement, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 139, 143–44 (2008).
20 Genus claims refer to claims that embody a number of separate species that make up the genus.
21 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022).
22 Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 74, 85 (1854).
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demands for developing a discovery in the medical arts and bringing it to market. If,
as the Federal Circuit has done presently, rigid laws are used to in effect kill off the
chances of obtaining any meaningful patent coverage using genus claims for
pharmaceuticals and biologics, then it will likely have a deleterious effect on society by
inhibiting advances in new drug discovery and development and ultimately patient
access to new medicines.
As is developed further infra in parts IV–VI, recent Federal Circuit
jurisprudence has deviated from statutory text and replaced having jury involvement
on a case-by-case manner to instead provide for judicially-created rigid rules that not
only have no statutory foundation, but are also not supported by Supreme Court
precedent. Perhaps most importantly, in practice, the recent heightened requirements
for § 112(a) has now made it all but impossible to obtain genus claims on
pharmaceuticals and biologics. The creation of the written description doctrine by the
courts in the 1970s had a narrow and useful limited scope, however, ever since the
Lilly decision in 1997, the scope of this doctrine has grown and been increasingly used
as a sharp tool to invalidate patent claims. In particular, the written description
requirement now demands that inventors show they “had possession of the claimed
subject matter,” including the infringing embodiment, “as of the filing date.” 23 And yet,
“possession” is not a statutory requirement, but a judicial doctrine.24 As will be
developed infra in part V and VI, this approach to written description has much room
for improvement.
Similarly, the enablement requirement is also being misinterpreted by the
Federal Circuit. To comply with the enablement requirement, the current law requires
“full scope” enablement by identifying every covered species that is encompassed by a
genus claim even if there could be thousands of related species and screening and
testing them would be “largely routine.” Current enablement laws invalidate such
genus claims “as a matter of law” because the claimed genus “would require
synthesizing and screening” thousands of compounds for the desired effects.25 This
current fascination with identifying the boundaries of the patent claim by identifying
every species that falls within a genus to demonstrate what the Federal Circuit calls
“full scope” enablement is misguided. This is especially so, given identifying every
species of a genus has no practical effect on the ability of an ordinary skilled artisan to
make and test an operable species. As will be developed infra in parts IV–VI, this
approach to enablement has much room for improvement.
On a more general level and separate to the focus on genus claims, another
problem with the Federal Circuit’s separate written description and enablement
requirements is that neither of these two new approaches for interpreting enablement
23 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); see also
Alcon Research Ltd. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 745 F.3d 1180, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (referring to “two
separate and independent requirements” of written description and enablement).
24 “The courts have described the essential question to be addressed in a description requirement
issue in a variety of ways.” U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2163.02 (10th ed. 2020) [hereinafter “MPEP”]. “To satisfy the
written description requirement, an applicant must convey with reasonable clarity to those skilled in
the art that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention, and that the
invention, in that context, is whatever is now claimed.” (citing Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d
1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
25 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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and separately written description have any foundation in the statutory text of § 112(a)
and moreover conflict with Supreme Court precedent generally and on genus claims
specifically.
35 U.S.C. § 112 mandates that patent applications must “contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use the same.”26 Instead of adhering to this statutory text, the Federal
Circuit’s decision to flout statutory text and split enablement and written description
into two separate requirements has resulted in the court following-up and judicially
creating the court’s new “possession” standard and various sub-tests for written
description, plus simultaneously shifting the enablement inquiry from the wellgrounded “undue experimentation” factors to a requirement for patentees to now make
and test all of the species within a genus and highlight which species works and which
does not. This is a fundamental shift in approach. 27
Part IV of this article highlights how the Federal Circuit’s current
jurisprudence on § 112(a) is causing havoc in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries. Innovators in this space are dammed if they do and dammed if they don’t.
Namely, they cannot claim the full scope of their invention because that would violate
both the new genus-targeting rigid, numbers-focused “full scope” enablement rule and
the separate written description’s “possession” requirement if too few species are
disclosed. Yet, innovators also cannot claim narrowly as that would enable competitors
to design around narrow claims and take advantage by making minor changes to
claims to create similarly efficacious pharmaceuticals that achieve the same outcome.
It is for this reason that § 112 is eviscerating patent scope in certain industries much
more so than others.28
In some respects, the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence on § 112(a) is not
only punishing innovators in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector, but also
26 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022); see e.g., Patent Act 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22; see also,
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793):

And be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the
time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in
writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and
explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a
model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described
as aforesaid, in the said patents; which specification shall be so particular, and said
models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other
things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled
in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest
connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have
the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term; which specification
shall be filed in the office of the said Secretary, and certified copies thereof, 'shall
be competent evidence in all courts and before all jurisdictions, where any matter
or thing, touching or concerning such patent, right, or privilege, shall come in
question.
35. U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022).
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RSRV. L.
REV. 691, 706 (2004); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1184 (2002).
27
28
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providing rewards for the copycats. Creative innovators in this biomedical industry
will turn their back on the patent system if their key inventions are suddenly not able
to get the protection that they used to. Protection for narrow species does not
adequately reward the innovator and allows copycats to make minor changes and
bypass infringement without having to go through the difficult, expensive, and timeconsuming innovation process. The long-term cost of this will be net negative for
patients, as innovative pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies will pivot to
target established biological pathways and targets rather than venture into new
horizons. The result: potential new targets and therapeutics for patients will decline
industry wide.
To fix § 112, part VI of this article proposes alternatives to the Federal Circuit’s
presently applied rigid approach to § 112(a), namely where genus claims that cover
many species fail both the enablement requirement because they do not satisfy “full
scope” enablement, and also fail the separate written description because the patent
application is not able to show “possession” of the species upon filing. Instead of this
current approach, one option to fix this problem would be to treat § 112(a) as having a
singular requirement – a written description that enables – and make determinations
on violations or compliance of the statute on a case by case, context-specific and flexible
manner.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 35 U.S.C. § 112(A)
The requirement that a patent application “describe” the invention is nothing
new. Indeed, this requirement has carried through from the language of the first
Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793 to today.29 For example, similar in language to the
current law, the Patent Act of 1793 provided that the inventor: “shall deliver a written
description of the invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the
same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other
things before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art to make, compound,
and use the same.”30 Other similarities in the statutory language between the Patent
Act of 1793 and current law concerning how an invention should be “described” and
enabled also exist. For example, similar to the Patent Act of 1952, the Patent Act of
1793 requires “a written description of the invention”31 and that it be “in such full,
clear and exact terms . . . and to enable.”32

29

Today, this is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112. 35 U.S.C. 112(a) provides:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor or joint inventor of carrying out the invention.

Id. (emphasis added) (2022).
The Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, §3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22 (emphasis added).
31 While the Patent Act of 1793 mentions “shall deliver a written description”, the Patent Act of
1952 requires that patent application “shall contain a written description.” Patent Act of 1952, ch. 11,
§ 112, 66 Stat. 792, 798 (emphasis added).
32 See The Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793, supra note 26.
30
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However, this 200+ year old Patent Act, unlike current law, required that the
written description distinguish the invention from the prior art.33 Although the
requirement to have “a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear and
exact terms” was maintained in the Patent Act of 1836, the requirement for the written
description be used to distinguish the invention from the prior art was removed in 1836
and instead “claims” that clearly identify the invention were introduced and became a
requirement.34 Subsequent Patent Acts, including the Patent Act of 1870, kept this
language intact.35 The same language was also used in the Patent Act of 1952 and
today, the written description requirement is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a),36 with 35
U.S.C. § 112(b) requiring clarity in claim language.37 Thus, under current law, the
patent claims aim to distinguish the invention from the prior art, and the specification
of the patent application is used to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the
claimed invention.38
A. Appellate Courts’ Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
The first patent statute was passed in 1790 in the U.S., and it included the
requirement that patent application describe the invention.39 Since then and over the
last 230+ years, the Patent Act has been amended a number of times, however, this
“written description” requirement was left intact,40 albeit its role became less

See id.
The Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119.
35 The Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201.
36 Id.
37 Requires that the claims “particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter” the
inventor “regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. 112(b) provides that “[t]he specification shall conclude
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2022).
38 Id.
39 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1–7, 1 Stat. 109, 110–11 (repealed 1793) (emphasis added)
(requiring patentee to deliver specification describing invention to Secretary of State).
40 Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22:
33
34

Every inventor, before he can receive a patent shall deliver a written description of
his invention, and of the manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in
such full, clear, and exact terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things
before known, and to enable any person skilled in the art or science of which it is a
branch, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the
same;
Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119:
He shall deliver a written description of his invention or discover, and of the manner
and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same, in such
full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person
skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make, construct, compound, and use the same;
752.

Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201; Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat.
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significant once having “claims” in a patent application became a statutory
requirement.41
Written description and enablement are two separate requirements under
current patent laws in the U.S.42 Although there is great overlap between these two
doctrines and the justification of having two such closely overlapping requirements
stemming from the same sentence of the statute is at best unclear, there remains
nevertheless the idea that written description and enablement serve different
purposes. Namely, while written description aims to make sure an inventor had
“possession” of her invention upon filing of the patent application,43 the enablement
requirement aims to ensure that sufficient disclosure is provided in the patent
application such that an ordinary skilled artisan could practice the invention without
having to perform “undue experimentation.”44
The Federal Circuit has provided “illustrative, not mandatory”45 guidance for
determining if any experimentation is “undue” 46 and this includes assessing various
factors, such as (1) the breadth of the claims; (2) the nature of the invention; (3) the
state of the prior art; (4) the level of one of ordinary skill; (5) the level of predictability
in the art; (6) the amount of direction provided by the inventor; (7) the existence of
working examples; and (8) the quantity of experimentation needed to make or use the
invention based on the content of the application as filed.47 Under this rubric, the
specification is found to be enabled only if upon balancing of these factors an ordinary
skilled artisan could make and use the invention without undue experimentation. 48
This enablement requirement allows an ordinary skilled artisan to practice “the full
scope” of the invention and to do so, the specification of the patent must teach that
person “how to make and use the full scope of the claimed invention without undue
experimentation.”49 Some experimentation is permissible, so long as it is not “undue.” 50
Enablement has a 200+ year old statutory foundation, however, the actual
doctrine of enablement was developed by the courts and their judicial interpretation of
the statute. This doctrine has been a feature of patent law in the U.S. since 1832, if
not before.51 The written description as a requirement for patent applications,

41 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (“Claim practice did not achieve
statutory recognition until the passage of the Act of 1836 and did not become a statutory requirement
until 1870.”); see Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198.
42 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc).
43 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2163.
44 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2164.
45 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
46 Patent applications must “contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make
and use the same.” 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022). It is noteworthy that the term “undue experimentation”
does not appear in the statute, however, “it is well established that enablement requires that the
specification teach those in the art to make and use the invention without undue experimentation.”
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
47 In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
48 Id.
49 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
50 Sean B. Seymore, Patenting Around Failure, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1139, 1165–73 (2018); see
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
51 Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 241–42 (1832) (“The public yields nothing which it has not
agreed to yield; it receives all which it has contracted to receive. The full benefit of the discovery.”).
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however, was first developed in case law from the 1970s.52 Beginning in the 1990s, the
Federal Circuit changed this area of settled law to instead impose a new court-created
written description standard.53 During this period, the Federal Circuit desired to stop
the amending of patent claims during prosecution to capture broader scope than what
was disclosed in the specification upon filing of the patent application. To do so, the
Federal Circuit started requiring patent applications “convey with reasonable clarity
to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date sought, that the patentee was in
possession of the invention.”54
Judges, scholars, and practitioners alike have argued against having separate
requirements for enablement and written description.55 Indeed, there is nothing in the
statute that would indicate patent specifications must include separate requirements
for written description and enablement. Instead, the statue requires a written
description of the invention that enables the claimed invention.56 Since written
description is a relatively new doctrine that has been developed by the courts and one
which lacks any statutory foundation, the Federal Circuit has developed, and several
times revised, subtests for assessing compliance with the court’s new “possession”
requirement for written description. And yet, as is developed further infra in parts III–
V, the latest version of this requirement has fundamental problems with it, especially
as it relates to its application within the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries.57 This evolving nature in how this judge-made law is being applied is
causing great uncertainty and instability to the detriment of society as a whole.58
Turning to enablement, there is a history of a split between appellate decisions
that recognize disclosure of one mode of an invention as being sufficient to satisfy the
enablement requirement and other decisions that require “full scope” of the claim to
be enabled. For example, the theme in one line of Federal Circuit cases is that “the
enablement requirement is met if the description enables any mode of making and

Id.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Enzo Biochem,
Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 979–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
54 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“To the uninitiated, it may
seem anomalous that the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 has been interpreted as requiring a
separate ‘description of the invention.’”).
55 Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description”
Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–69
(2000).
56 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022):
52
53

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best
mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
(emphasis added).
57 See discussion in part IV, infra.
58 The Federal Circuit recently created several “possession” sub-tests, which they later modified
or rescinded.
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using the invention.”59 That is, disclosure of one mode is sufficient. And yet, another
line of Federal Circuit cases stands for the opposite – that disclosure of a single mode
fails to enable an invention’s “full scope.”60 Moreover, as is discussed separately in
parts IV and V, the level of disclosure required to satisfy the separate, yet related,
written description requirement is also hotly debated amongst various stakeholders.
One of the early “one mode” line of enablement decisions is Engel Industries,
Inc., a decision that stands for the proposition that any mode of making and using an
invention would satisfy the enablement requirement.61 Other cases also highlighted
that patentees are not expected to provide test results of every species encompassed
by their patent claim. For example, in In re Angstadt, 62 the patentee claimed a method
of catalytically oxidizing alkylaromatic hydrocarbons to form a mixture comprising the
corresponding hydroperoxides.63 The claim was rejected on the basis that an ordinary
skilled artisan would not have known which catalysts would produce the desired
hydroperoxides without performing undue experimentation. 64 However, the court
reversed the USPTO, deciding that the patentee was not required to “disclose a test
with every species covered by a claim” since that would require the specification to
contain thousands of examples which would be “a prohibitive number of actual
experiments.”65 This analysis was later clarified by the other seminal and often cited
case of In re Wands.66
More recently and in direct contrast to its own “one mode” precedent, the
Federal Circuit has embraced the “full scope” of the claim enablement doctrine. For
example, in Automotive Technologies v BMW, the court decided that one embodiment
of practicing the invention would not be enough, 67 stating that “disclosure of only
mechanical side impact sensors does not permit one skilled in the art to make and use
the invention as broadly as it was claimed, which includes electronic side impact
sensors.”68 Similarly, in Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, the court rejected the

59 See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Engel
Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991)) (holding claim to genus of
antibodies enabled by disclosure of one cell line); Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699
F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2012); and Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313,
1338–39 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enablement requirement satisfied if the description enables “any mode of
making and using the invention”); Johns Hopkins, 152 F.3d at 1359.
60 Auto. Techs. Intl, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see also
ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding “full scope” of claims
not enabled where one of two methods of drug delivery disclosed); Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516
F.3d 993, 999–1000 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding claim to games as failing the enablement requirement
when movies also fell within claim’s scope).
61 Engel Indus., Inc. v. Lockformer Co., 946 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also In re Glass,
492 F.2d 1228, 1233 (C.C.P.A 1974) (“Nonenablement is failure to disclose any mode.”).
62 In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 501–02 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (rejecting an enablement challenge
despite the need for experimentation).
63 Id. at 499.
64 Id. at 501.
65 Id. at 502.
66 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
67 Auto. Techs., 501 F.3d at 1285. This case involved a claim to two embodiments, with only one
of them being disclosed in the specification. The court found that failure to disclose both embodiments
made the claim directed to both embodiments invalid.
68 Id.
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disclosure of one embodiment as satisfying the enablement requirement,69 citing
another decision for the proposition that “as part of the quid pro quo of the patent
bargain, the applicant’s specification must enable one of ordinary skill in the art to
practice the full scope of the claimed invention.”70 Moreover, another older case was
used as support for this “full scope” enablement of the invention, rejecting single
embodiments as failing the enablement requirement.71
This concept of the scope of patent claims being “commensurate” with the
teachings of the patent disclosure is also a feature that was developed as a doctrine
in the 1970s and is routinely applied to date.72 For example, in Fisher, the court
opined that “the scope of the claims must bear a reasonable correlation to the scope
of enablement provided by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art .” 73
However, the split between the one mode and “full scope” enablement lines of
Federal Circuit cases is best placed in context by reviewing Supreme Court decisions
that have interpreted the relevant statute. Of the Supreme Court cases from the 19th
century on point, Morse v. O’Reilly is best known. There, the inventor for the telegraph,
Morse, sued O’Reilly for infringing his patent.74 The Supreme Court invalided the
claim because Morse indicated that he did not wish to limit his invention to the
specification and claims.75 Chief Justice Taney found the claim invalid, explaining “this
claim can derive no aid from the specification filed. It is outside of it, and the patentee
claims beyond it.”76 Two 19th century Supreme Court decisions that followed Morse
both indicated that patent claims stand valid and adequately supported by a single
disclosed mode for carrying out the method.77 And yet, although Alexander Graham
69 Similar to the Automotive Tech. decision, this case involved a claim to two embodiments, with
only one of them being disclosed in the specification. The patent claim was deemed invalid because
the specification did not disclose both embodiments. Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, 481 F.3d 1371,
1379–81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
70 Id. at 1380 (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003)) (emphasis
added).
71 In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“the applicant's specification must enable
one of ordinary skill in the art to practice the full scope of the claimed invention.”)
72 In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
73 Id.
74 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (17 How.) 62, 77 (1853).
75 Id. Claim 8 of Morse’s patent stated, “I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery
or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electro-magnetism,
however developed, for making or printing intelligible characters, signs or letters, at any distances,
being a new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.” Id.
(emphasis added).
76 Id. at 119–20.
77 Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 728–30 (1880); Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126
U.S. 1, 535 (1888). In Tilghman, the Court stated that:

If the mode of applying the process is not obvious, then a description of a particular
mode by which it may be applied is sufficient. There is, then, a description of the
process and of one practical mode in which it may be applied. Perhaps the process
is susceptible of being applied in many modes and by the use of many forms of
apparatus. The inventor is not bound to describe them all in order to secure to
himself the exclusive right to the process, if he is really its inventor or discoverer.
But he must describe some particular mode, or some apparatus, by which the
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Bell’s broad patent claim was held valid,78 the Supreme Court found the claim in the
Incandescent Lamp to be invalid as too broad given the disclosure.79 In some respects,
much akin to the split in the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the statute, there
appears to also be some form of a split in the Supreme Court’s own decisions, albeit
this has been interestingly reconciled by using an implicit doctrine.80
Courts have interpreted § 112 as requiring a written description that enables.
In particular, requiring a written description “of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it” such that it is “in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable” an ordinary skilled artisan to practice the invention.81
On written description, one of the first Supreme Court decisions to interpret
the Patent Act of 1793 is Evans v. Eaton.82 Here, the Supreme Court invalided a patent
directed to an improved hopperboy for failing to satisfy the written description
requirement because no distinct improvement was disclosed.83 In this 1822 decision,
the Supreme Court opined that the written description was necessary so that patentees
would not obtain patents that are “broader than their invention.” 84 More recently, the
Federal Circuit’s predecessor found a claim to a single compound invalid for failing the
written description requirement where the specification disclosed a general chemical
structure with multiple variables.85 Here, the court found that the general disclosure
could yield “half a million possible compounds” and that this does “not constitute
support for” a claim to one particular compound unless there is further disclosures to
guide an ordinary skilled artisan to choose that particular compound over many other
options.86 This was the first time that the court had used written description separate
from enablement in order to disallow new matter to be added during patent
prosecution in order to prevent applicants from using the amendment process to
update their disclosures.87
This case was later interpreted by others outside of the narrow context of
determining priority and date of invention, with these latter cases creating an
process can be applied with at least some beneficial result, in order to show that it
is capable of being exhibited and performed in actual experience.
Tilghman, 102 U.S. at 728–29. In Dolbear, the Court stated that:
The law does not require that a discoverer or inventor, in order to get a patent for
a process, must have succeeded in bringing his art to the highest degree of
perfection; it is enough if he describes his method with sufficient clearness and
precision to enable those skilled in the matter to understand what the process is,
and if he points out some practicable way of putting it into operation.
Dolbear, 126 U.S. at 536.
78 Dolbear, 126 U.S.at 539.
79 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 472, 476–77 (1895).
80 Jason Rantanen, The Doctrinal Structure of Patent Law's Enablement Requirement, 69 VAND.
L. REV. 1679, 1705–07 (2019).
81 Roy v. Tatham, 63 U.S. (1 Black) 132, 138–139 (1860).
82 Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
83 Id. at 434.
84 Id. at 431–32.
85 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 996 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
86 Id. at 993.
87 Id.
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additional requirement above and beyond that stated in the statute, namely that
patent applications must also have a written description of the invention and
demonstrate that the inventor “was in possession of the invention” as of the filing
date.88 Indeed, the Federal Circuit embraced this requirement outside of the narrow
context of priority determinations and in 1997, in Lilly, decided a patent claim is
invalid on the basis that the inventor had not shown “possession” of his invention and
therefore failed the written description requirement.89 This decision and others that
followed it were met with great skepticism by judges, scholars and practitioners alike.90
For example, Judge Rader viewed the Federal Circuit’s decision in Lilly to be the first
time the written description was being used as a “general disclosure doctrine in place
of enablement.”91 In his and other scholars’ view, the use of the written description
requirement outside of context of policing against new matter addition during
prosecution has elevated the written description to “an effective super enablement
standard.”92
In Ariad v. Lilly,93 the court decided the key question of whether the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C § 112 requires a written description that enables one of skill in
the art to make and use the claimed invention (single requirement), or requires a
written description separate and apart from the enablement requirement (double
requirement). Over vigorous dissents,94 the Federal Circuit sat en banc and the
majority reaffirmed that written description and enablement are distinct
requirements, and each is to be assessed under different standards. In Ariad, the claim
was to a method for regulating gene expression using the transcription factor NF-kB.95
The court held that the claims encompassed a genus of ways to obtain the desired
outcome and yet the specification had not disclosed a representative number of species
from within that claimed genus that could accomplish that desired result.96 The court
used this biomedical case to also reject the notion that the application of written
description in this new way amounts to a “super enablement” standard being applied
to pharmaceutical and biotechnology inventions.97
Thus, in this key case, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, reaffirmed its prior
decision in Lilly, holding that that 35 U.S.C § 112 requires separate written description
and enablement, with each having different standards.98 Whereas the enablement
requirement is grounded in statutory language, namely a “written description of the
manner and process of making and using” the invention so that it is “full, clear, concise,
and exact” as to enable ordinary skilled artisans to practice the invention, the written
description requirement is a judge-made, non-statutory requirement that mandates

Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
90 See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Linn,
J., dissenting); Id. at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting in part).
91 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 979–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Lilly, 119 F.3d at
1566–67.
92 Enzo Biochem, Inc., 323 F.3d at 982.
93 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1366.
94 Id. at 1361–67 (Rader, J. dissenting in part); Id. at 1368 (Linn, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 1351.
96 Id. at 1350.
97 Id. at 1352.
98 Id.
88
89
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patent applications convey “that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject
matter as of the filing date.”99 Moreover, to apply its judicially-created “possession”
standard, the Federal Circuit also created various sub-tests. For example, based on
Lilly, for pharmaceutical genus claims, “a representative number of species within the
genus” is required to show “possession” of the genus.100 The Ariad decision endorsed
Lilly’s sub-test and this broader extra-statutory new written description doctrine has
since been used to invalidate many patents.101
The current law, therefore, has resulted in an unclear landscape where
stakeholders are not certain of the contours of the varying sub-tests, particularly how
many or what type of species are required to satisfy the requirements of 35 U.S.C § 112
for claiming a genus.
III. GENUS CLAIMS DRIVE INNOVATION IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES
The Patent Act is “a technology-neutral statute.”102 However, the nonstatutory, judge-created “possession” requirement (a.k.a “super enablement”) and its
related sub-tests, in practice, have accounted for technology-targeted barriers to
patentability. Namely, this standard has amounted to a unique obstacle for patenting
innovation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology sector – an obstacle that would be
“inconceivable in other industries.”103
As such, the scope of § 112(a) is being used by the Federal Circuit to erect
barriers to patentability, especially in the essential fields of pharmaceuticals and
biotechnology. In these biomedical fields, patent claims to a group of related molecules,
or “genus,” are used as key features of the commercialization process for these
innovations.104 Until recently and before the Federal Circuit changed course
dramatically to limit use of genus claims, such claims to a genus of small molecules or,
for example, large molecules such as antibodies, were allowed by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and upheld by courts for satisfying the enablement requirement. 105
Genus claims are a fundamental feature of the patent landscape in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry and innovative companies within this
industry rely on such claim drafting strategies in a predictable patent system to protect
their investments in bringing novel therapeutics to market. It is estimated that less
than 10% of drugs in development at a given time will ever reach the market, and the
cost for doing so is between $2-3 billion for bringing one new drug to market.106 It is,
therefore, perhaps not surprising that in just the past decade, hundreds of billions of
Id. at 1344–45, 1351 (emphasis added).
Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568–1569.
101 See e.g., Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
102 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
103 Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1653–1654
(2003); Craig A. Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L.
REV. 1619, 1664 (2007).
104 In re Kalm, 378 F.2d 959, 963 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (indicating that in chemistry, “genus” means “a
group of compounds closely related both in structure and in properties.”).
105 Alan L. Durham, Patent Scope and Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts, 94 N.C. L. REV.
1101, 1109 (2015).
106 Sullivan, supra note 1.
99

100

[21:121:22]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

136

dollars have been spent on discovery and development of innovative compounds and
therapeutics to satisfy society’s growing medical needs.
Since genus claims are central to patent protection in these vital industries,
forgoing strong patent protection that such claims provide will result in fewer
companies ever taking on the considerable risk of expending monetary resources on
developing such pharmaceuticals or biologics.107 Sadly, if the Federal Circuit does not
change course and continues to use its recent § 112(a) jurisprudence to disincentivize
truly innovative companies, the practical reality is that new drug development will
become stagnated and slow considerably in the decades ahead.
A. Genus Claims
A key mechanism by which companies in the pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries protect their innovation is by using genus claims as part
of their patent portfolio management strategy. Often the discovery of a chemical
that has a particular use enables the inventor, for example, to capitalize on the
discovery by claiming not only that one chemical entity that was discovered but
also all related chemical structures that would perform the same function. These
related chemical structures form a genus. As such, patent lawyers’ clients who
have made a discovery of one “species” of a chemical will typically aim to protect
more than just that species. These genus claims are carefully drafted to
encompass a broader claim to structurally similar compounds (i.e. to capture
many species within that genus). These genus claims that once were the stable
feature of patent law have recently become all but worthless; so much so that
prominent scholars have gone so far as recently saying that genus claims are
dead.108 As is discussed in part IV, genus claims should be reaffirmed as being
viable under the Patent Act. To do otherwise, would be to upend the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries’ incentives to develop novel drugs
and biologics and their ability to protect their innovation.
Until relatively recently, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office allowed
genus claims to issue and courts upheld their validity during litigation so long as
the specification included enough information that a person of ordinary skill in
the art could practice the invention without undue experimentation.109 However,
claiming a genus as a tool in patent law practice has all but disappeared as an
option, directly because of changes in how the Federal Circuit is now interpreting
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). For example, presently, if a genus encompasses thousands of
possible chemicals, the court will reject the genus claim as invalid, if it does not
further detail the nature of each of those species to identify those that work for its
intended purpose. This fundamental change in approach has been especially felt
in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries.

Giugni & Giugni, supra note 7, at 493–506.
Karshtedt et al., supra note 3, at 5.
109 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022) (provision containing the enablement requirement).
107
108
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IV. CURRENT 35 U.S.C. § 112(A) JURISPRUDENCE IS UNTENABLE AND
HIGHLY DAMAGING FOR NEW DRUG AND BIOLOGICS DEVELOPMENT
New drug development is a process that takes sometimes decades and costs
into the billions of dollars.110 Innovative biopharma companies pursue this process
with no guarantees of success. During this research and development process, the
research can generate a large group of chemically related compounds that the
inventors believe would be active against the target disease or condition. As part of the
race to file a patent application before others on such a discovery, patentees often file
patent applications with claims that encompass a large genus of compounds to obtain
meaningful patent protection on their discovery.
Were it not for the ability to protect such painstaking research with genus
patent claims, it would be easy for third parties to design around very narrow
embodiments of a particular species and instead practice substantially similar
compounds without infringing the innovator’s patent and thereby unfairly take
advantage of the innovator’s time and expense spent to develop the technology.
Conversely, it is self-evident to see that by allowing too broad a genus claim, a patent
can then be used as a weapon to prevent others from researching and developing
technology in that field. As such, although this tunes our attention to assess where the
line gets drawn vis-à-vis the validity of genus claims, it is clear that the present status
quo for genus claims is unpredictable and untenable and has cost and will cost the
drug development industry dearly.
Viewed holistically with a broad lens, it is perhaps revealing to appreciate that
many initiatives have been taken from U.S. patent law and been adopted by foreign
countries and, in parallel, other harmonization efforts have occurred here in the U.S.
with the recent America Invents Act to align U.S. patent law more in harmony with
patent laws of other key industrialized countries.111 However, as strange (or wise) as
it may appear, other industrialized foreign nations have adopted many features of
American patent laws and yet they have not adopted our patent disclosure laws. For
example, while the Federal Circuit has pushed the U.S. into a corner and now requires
rigid patent disclosure, the European Patent Office does not require patentees that
claim, for example, a genus of antibodies “to provide evidence that an antibody has
actually been produced if the target is susceptible to routine methods of antibody
production.”112 Australia’s Patents Act of 1990 was amended in 2012 to, in direct
contrast to the U.S., align itself with the European Patent Office’s view on enablement
and sufficiency.113 Lastly, similar to the European approach, in Canada “claims to an
Id.
For example, changing U.S. patent law from a first to invent to first to file.
112 Yifan Mao & Andrew Serafini, Navigating Key Differences in Therapeutic Antibody Patent
Protection Strategies Between the United States and Europe, JDSUPRA (April 29, 2021),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/navigating-key-differences-in-8802999/; Mathys & Squire,
Patenting antibodies at the European Patent Office, MATHYS & SQUIRE (October 6, 2020)
https://www.mathys-squire.com/insights-and-events/news/patenting-antibodies-at-the-europeanpatent-office/; Donald Zuhn et al., News from Abroad: Antibodies in the European Patent Office,
PATENT DOCS (Dec. 20, 2016), https://www.patentdocs.org/2016/12/news-from-abroad-antibodies-inthe-european-patent-office-.html.
113 Tony Shaw & Candace Wu, Navigating Australian Antibody Patent Protection Strategies,
ALLENS
LINKLATERS
(Feb.
10,
2022),
https://www.allens.com.au/insightsnews/insights/2022/02/Antibody-patent-protection-in-Australia/.
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antibody specific for a novel antigen can be obtained even in the absence of working
examples if the antigen is sufficiently described.”114 In essence and as is discussed
further infra, this is the holding of Noelle in the U.S. from not long ago,115 which was
later abandoned by the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit’s abrupt change in course
in its patent disclosure jurisprudence will have grave consequences for new pioneering
pharmaceutical and biotechnology development in the U.S. and threatens to push
creative companies to pursue groundbreaking research and development in other
industrialized jurisdictions outside of the U.S., countries having more stable and
predictable patent laws.
A. The Federal Circuit’s Enablement Rule for Genus Claims is Broken
Statutory construction is required to “start where the statute does.” 116 The
relevant statute at the center of this piece, namely Section 112 of the current Patent
Act, states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.117
Historically, the key function of the enablement requirement has been to
provide a specification that teaches a person having ordinary skill in the art
(hereinafter “PHOSITA”) how to make and use the invention without undue
experimentation.118 The Federal Circuit has provided “illustrative, not mandatory” 119
guidance on how to determine if any experimentation is “undue” by assessing various
factors, including:
(1) the breadth of the claims; (2) the nature of the invention; (3) the
state of the prior art; (4) the level of one of ordinary skill; (5) the level
of predictability in the art; (6) the amount of direction provided by the
inventor; (7) the existence of working examples; and (8) the quantity of
experimentation needed to make or use the invention based on the
content of the application as filed.120
Under this rubric, the specification is found to be enabled only if upon
balancing of these factors a PHOSITA could make and use the invention without undue

114 Carmela De Luca & Anastassia Trifonova, Patent Disclosure Requirements for Therapeutic
Antibody Patents, 27 EXPERT OPIN. THERAPUETIC PAT. 867, 869 (2017).
115 Noelle v. Lederman, 355 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
116 SAS Inst. Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1355 (2018).
117 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022) (emphasis added).
118 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2164.
119 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
120 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
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experimentation.121 As later decisions reiterated, and has been widely accepted, “to
enable any person skilled in the art” means “without requiring undue
experimentation.”122
Inventions in the fields of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology typically are
different in how they are developed when compared to inventions in other fields. For
example, a discovery of a compound that has a positive effect on cancer cells leads
typically to discovering a family of related compounds that has the same effect. As
such, once the inventor makes such a discovery, it can be more routine work to decipher
any other member of the family of related compounds that can produce the same effect.
In practice, of course, the patentee would wish to capture a broad patent claim that
would cover the full family of related compounds. Indeed, using such genus claims –
i.e., claims that the Supreme Court outlined as “deal[ing] with a large class of
substances and the range of treatment within the terms of the claims”123 – is a crucial
aspect of how innovation in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields is protected.
The structure of such genus claims in the biomedical field will typically include certain
“structural requirements” that all species falling within the scope of the genus have,
as well as the “function” that the species can perform.124
The enablement doctrine is premised on requiring that patentees provide
sufficient information in their patent application such that an ordinary skilled artisan
could practice the invention without having to perform “undue experimentation.”125
Guidance has been provided for assessing what experimentation would be “undue” in
the Wands factors.126 In In re Wands, the technology related to the in vitro production
of antibodies capable of identifying the hepatitis B virus.127 An ordinary skilled artisan
wishing to practice the invention would need to isolate and clone hybridoma cells,
culture them and test them for their desired function. However, the court held that
this level of experimentation would not be “undue” because it would be routine for a
person of ordinary skill in the art.128 The court reasoned that not only was the level of
skill in this field of art high and techniques well known in the art, but also that the
patent application had provided significant guidance so that it would not be “undue”
because the experiments involve repetition of known or commonly used techniques. 129
There is a history of a split between decisions from the Federal Circuit that
recognize disclosure of one mode of an invention as being sufficient to satisfy the
enablement requirement and other decisions that require “full scope” of the claim to
be enabled. In the past, courts recognized the validity of genus claims, especially those
found in pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents. For example, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (“CCPA”) found it untenable to require patentees draft
“a patent application or applications with thousands of examples,” as well as
121
122

(2022).

Id.
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 35 U.S.C. § 112

Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916).
McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc., 959 F.3d 1091, 1100 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
125 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2164.
126 In re Wands, 858 F. 2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
127 Id. at 734–35.
128 Id. at 738.
129 Id. at 736–38; see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (“Routine experimentation does not constitute undue experimentation.”).
123
124
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“disclosure of thousands of catalysts along with information as to whether each
exhibits catalytic behavior.”130 The court reasoned that it “would force an inventor
seeking adequate patent protection to carry out a prohibitive number of actual
experiments.”131 As discussed supra, the court in In re Wands made a similar point to
find the enablement requirement was satisfied where a person of ordinary skill in the
art could make and use the disclosed invention.132 The standard for the amount and
kind of experimentation necessary is one of reasonableness. 133 That is, whether
experimentation is “undue” depends on the degree of experimentation and the
standard to assess that is to gauge what would be reasonable.134 Indeed, a
“considerable amount of experimentation” is allowed, if it is “‘merely routine,’ or the
specification provides ‘a reasonable amount of guidance.’”135
This established law for determining compliance with enablement laws has
changed drastically of late. This new direction taken by the Federal Circuit goes
against Supreme Court precedent as well as the Federal Circuit’s own prior decisions
related to genus claims. The focus had correctly been on whether the patent application
teaches a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the chemical species
within the genus, as required by § 112(a) statute, and without having to do any “undue
experimentation.”136 And yet, recent jurisprudence on this issue now rejects such an
approach and favors the enablement test to instead be whether the patent application
points out which of all the species in the genus will work. This shift in approach to
enablement is proving fatal for pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents because the
genus claims can cover thousands of related species and the patent applications do not,
understandably, disclose every species in the patent application. The Federal Circuit’s
present approach to enablement is flawed and harmful both to innovation in the
essential fields of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology and for the development of new
lifesaving treatments.
B. The Federal Circuit’s Enablement Law Conflicts with Supreme Court
Jurisprudence
In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
Id.
132 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 738 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
133 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013); Chiron Corp.
v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
134 See ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A ‘reasonable’
amount of routine experimentation” is allowed); In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737 (“The determination of
what constitutes undue experimentation in a given case requires the application of a standard of
reasonableness”); Cephalon, Inc. v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 707 F.3d 1330, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A
reasonable amount of routine experimentation does not violate the enablement requirement.”).
135 Wyeth & Cordis Corp., 720 F.3d at 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013):
130
131

[T]he claim was to administering Rapamycin to prevent restenosis after a balloon
angioplasty procedure. The specification disclosed only one species of Rapamycin,
even though Rapamycin is genus of tens of thousands of compounds. Court held
claim not enabled because ordinary skilled artisan would have to undertake time
consuming testing to determine which of the thousands of Rapamycin compounds
would work.
136

Id.
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The Supreme Court has long recognized that patentees must be permitted to
claim more than just narrow embodiments of their invention because to do otherwise
would make a patent a “hollow and useless thing.”137 As a preliminary matter, the
statute requires that the specification of a patent application provide “such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains,
or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.”138 The Supreme
court has interpreted this to be the “the right of the jury to determine.”139 And yet, the
Federal Circuit, beginning in 1983, began to treat enablement as a question of law for
the court to decide.140 This question of law versus question of fact and why this is
important in such a fact-sensitive case-by-case inquiry is further explored infra in part
V(C), however, it is worth introducing this as a preliminary matter and just one
example of how the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on patent disclosure laws has
evolved to conflict with Supreme Court precedent.
The main problem with the Federal Circuit’s approach to a § 112(a) inquiry is
that the court has effectively judicially invented rules that have no statutory basis and
their recent implementation is causing disruption and having harmful effects on the
biomedical industry.141 The main reason is because this rigid jurisprudence is routinely
being used to invalidate a type of claim format that is at the heart of pharmaceutical
and biotechnology patent practice: the genus claim.142 The Federal Circuit’s shift in
position comes in the face of clear support for genus claims from the Supreme Court.
For example, the Supreme Court confirmed genus claims as a viable claiming option,
so long as the patentee can show some “common quality” between members of a
genus.143 In these early cases, enablement of genus claims centered on whether the
patent application sufficiently enabled an ordinary skilled artisan to “make and use”
embodiments of the invention.
The Federal Circuit has in recent years made a drastic shift in position
regarding their interpretation of a patent’s disclosure requirements. Whereas the focus
of the court used to be on whether a patent’s disclosure enables a person of ordinary
skill in the art to practice the invention without “undue experimentation,”144 this has
now evolved to become a test of how long it would take an ordinary skilled artisan to
make and test all of the species within the claimed genus, irrespective of which aspects
of that work would be routine work for the ordinary skilled artisan. The genus claim
in the technological fields of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology can encompass
thousands of species. In this context, the Federal Circuit has held that if identifying
every species of a claimed genus would require making and testing thousands of
compounds, the claim fails “as a matter of law.”145 In practice, the Federal Circuit’s
new numbers-based enablement requirement to identify every species in a genus is
proving fatal for a swathe of genus claims in pharmaceutical and biotechnology
Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022).
139 Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 74, 85 (1854).
140 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 960 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
141 Id.
142 Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
143 Corona Cord Tire Co. v. Dovan Chem. Corp., 276 U.S. 358, 385 (1928).
144 Id.
145 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
137
138
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patents. This rigid position is untenable and goes against both the text of the statute
and Supreme Court precedent.
The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance of using genus claims
to protect inventions. Without such claims, copycats can take advantage of innovators’
efforts to develop a technology without the threat of patent infringement by making
minor changes of a particular embodiment claimed in the innovators’ patent.146
Famously, the Supreme Court upheld Alexander Graham Bell’s genus patent claim for
the telephone, holding “it is enough if [the patentee] describes his method with
sufficient clearness and precision to enable those skilled in the matter to understand
what the process is, and if he points out some practicable way of putting it into
operation.”147 The Court further stated that Bell had “described, with sufficient
precision to enable one of ordinary skill in such matters to make the invention.” 148
However, in another case involving another famous inventor, Thomas Edison, the
Supreme Court did not hesitate in holding a patent claim invalid for failing the Patent
Act’s disclosure requirement by claiming very broadly when in fact they had made a
discovery limited to a certain embodiment for a light bulb filament.149
Other Supreme Court cases have made it clear that exclusively functional
patent claims are not acceptable given the vast scope of such claims,150 and neither are
patent claims that simply lack any support or guidance in the patent specification to
allow an ordinary skilled artisan to practice the disclosed invention.151 Notably,
although the Federal Circuit has interpreted § 112(a) as requiring two standards, both
the statute and Supreme Court precedent, such as The Telephone Cases, indicate just
one requirement.152 According to the Supreme Court, the patent application must
“describe the invention in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to make and use the same.”153 Indeed, the statute requires
inventors provide a written description that enables an ordinary skilled artisan to
make and use the invention – a singular requirement. Further still, the Supreme Court
has suggested that the only purpose of § 112(a) is enablement.154
Crucially, the Supreme Court has never indicated that a genus claim that is
well-defined and supported fails the enablement requirement unless that patent
application teaches ordinary skilled artisans to make and test all of the species within
the claimed genus. As such, not only is there no support in § 112(a) of the Patent Act

146 Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403, 437 (1902); see Cont'l Paper Bag Co. v.
E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419–20 (1908).
147 Dolbear v. Am. Bell. Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1, 536 (1888).
148 Id. at 535.
149 Consol. Elec. Light Co. v. McKeesport Light Co., 159 U.S. 465, 475–76 (1895).
150 Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 245, 256–58 (1928).
151 Tyler v. City of Boston, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 327, 330 (1868).
152 In Ariad, the Federal Circuit relied on two U.S. Supreme Court cases - Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S.
(7 Wheat) 356 (1822) and Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47 (1938) to hold that
§ 112(a) contains separate written-description and enablement requirements. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346–47 (Fed. Cir. 2010). However, neither of these cases fully support
the court’s analysis in Ariad.
153 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (emphasis added).
154 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 90 (2012); J.E.M. Ag Supply,
Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 142 (2001).
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for the Federal Circuit’s recent patent disclosure jurisprudence,155 the Supreme Court’s
decisions align themselves with the statutory text of the Patent Act and therefore both
are in conflict with the lower court’s stance. Much akin to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in KSR156 and Bilski157 to correct Federal Circuit’s rigid tests, as is discussed
in part VI, a correction is needed for patent disclosure laws.
C. The Federal Circuit Imposes Industry-Specific Barriers to Patentability
The Patent Act was drafted to apply equally to all technologies, meaning the
law would apply in the same manner irrespective of the invention and field of
technology before it. However, recent changes in the way the Federal Circuit is
interpreting the disclosure requirements of a patent is having a negative effect on the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries more so than other industries.158 One of
the key reasons this is taking place is because of the prevalence for the use of genus
claims in biomedical patent applications.
Genus claims are especially important and a key feature of patent practice in
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and function to protect and advance
innovation in this technological field.159 It takes years of effort and financial
expenditure in research and development to conceive and bring to market
groundbreaking inventions, especially one in the pharmaceutical or biotechnology
fields. The Federal Circuit has in recent years interpreted patent disclosure
requirements of the Patent Act to greatly increase the bar for obtaining patent
protection of genus claims. This in turn has imposed hurdles for innovators to recoup
their investments and in turn dampened follow-on innovation. In particular, whereas
in the past courts assessed whether patent applications “enable” a person of ordinary
skill in the art to “make and use” the disclosed invention without “undue
experimentation,”160 it is now necessary to enable the “full scope” of the claim. That is,
every species of a genus must now be enabled.161 In effect, this shift in how the Federal
Circuit approaches enablement is “a categorical shift in thinking away from teaching
the PHOSITA and towards a precise delineation of the boundaries of the claim.”162
The field of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology is targeted by this shift in
approach because the Federal Circuit now requires patent applications to exhaustively
catalog all variates that fall within a genus, even if they are closely overlapping.
However, this standard is not applied in the same way in other fields of art such as
software.163 This is not a controversial opinion, as many scholars have noted that when
it comes to the enablement and written description standard, courts apply a higher

155 See Part IV(B), supra, for a discussion on the statutory interpretation of § 112(a) and the
Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence on point.
156 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (holding that the Teaching, Suggestion,
Motivation test not the sole test for determining obviousness).
157 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010) (“. . . is not the sole test.”).
158 Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 28, at 706.
159 Sean B. Seymour, Patenting the Unexplained, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 707, 729 (2019).
160 As the 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) statute requires; see In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
161 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
162 Karshtedt et al., supra note 3, at 31.
163 Burk & Lemley, supra note 28, at 1184.
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standard in the biomedical fields than in other fields of art.164 It is thought that the
reason for this is because Chemistry and Biology are “unpredictable” fields and
therefore more disclosure is required in the patent application 165 than in other
applications which are directed to “predictable” fields of art such as mechanical and
electrical.166 If a field of art is deemed to be “unpredictable” by the Federal Circuit, “a
description of one species will ordinarily be insufficient to lay claim to the genus.” 167
The main culprit that practitioners, scholars and even judges on the Federal Circuit
alike point to for suggesting a higher written description standard exists in
biotechnology is the Federal Circuit’s decision in The Regents of the University of
California v. Eli Lilly & Co. 168
It is also perhaps noteworthy to contrast this standard of enablement and
written description as applied to the biomedical fields with the standard applied to
inventions in the software and business methods fields of art.169 The consensus is that
when the Federal Circuit changed course in Lilly, it highlighted how lop-sided and
technology-specific the practical application of this standard had become. 170 For
example, Burke and Lemley best summed this up by noting that the heightened
written description standard for biotechnology “would be inconceivable in other
industries, such as software.” 171 Indeed, there are empirical studies to show section
112 is not technology neutral.172 However, other scholars have questioned whether the
written description requirement after Lilly unfairly targets biotechnology more so than
other fields.173
35 U.S.C. §112(a) has been interpreted recently by the Federal Circuit as
requiring both a written description requirement and an enablement requirement,

164 Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834 (1999); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable
Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 137 (2008); Sean B. Seymore, The Enablement Pendulum Swings Back, 6
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 278, 282–83 (2008); Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law TechnologySpecific?, supra note 28, at 1156; Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note
28, at 691 (The Federal Circuit “claims that the uncertain nature of the [bio]technology requires
imposition of stringent patent enablement and written description requirements that are not applied
to patents in other disciplines.”); Burk & Lemley, supra note 103, at 1654.
165 Chao, supra note 13, at 6–8.
166 Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, supra note 164, at 137.
167 Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1163 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
168 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 19 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also Univ. of
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1314–24 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Chief Judge Rader dissenting
and including an appendix of scholarly articles that criticizes Lilly for its heightened standard).
169 Margaret A. Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements
Under 35 U.S.C. § 112 in the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1240–41 (2000).
170 Janis, supra note 55, at 86–88; Rai, supra note 164, at 834; Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving
Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 615, 626–28 (1998).
171 Burk & Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, supra note 28, at 1184; Burk & Lemley,
supra note 103, at 1654; Burk & Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, supra note 28, at 706.
172 John R. Allison & Lisa L. Ouellette, How Courts Adjudicate Patent Definiteness and
Disclosure, 65 DUKE L.J. 609, 621–23 (2016).
173 Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description A Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH.
1, 4–5 (2007); see Dennis Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description
Requirement in Patent Examination, 104 Nw. U. L. REV.. 1665, 1676–78 (2010).
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each subject to different standards.174 In this regard, the Federal Circuit’s decision in
Lilly175 marked a turning point after which this dual disclosure requirement was
established and found necessary for enforcing a patent.176 It is noteworthy, therefore,
that prior to the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Ariad in 2010, Lilly was one of
the most cited cases for showing that enablement and written description are two
separate requirements.177
To comply with the written description requirement, the patent application
must convey that the inventor had “possession” of the claimed invention upon filing of
the patent application. Genus claims – claims that encompass multiple embodiments
– raise the issue of written description and the Federal Circuit is nowadays focused on
possession of the “full scope” of the claimed invention. 178 This usually involves
providing a patent disclosure that includes “either a representative number of species
falling within the scope of the genus” or “structural features common to the members
of the genus” so that one of skill in the art can “visualize or recognize” the members of
the genus.179 However, the statute makes no mention of these heightened judge-made
requirements. Moreover, if a genus is functionally-defined, this test is even more
burdensome because structure cannot be derived from the patent claim language itself.
To further illustrate the Federal Circuit’s current jurisprudence targeting
biotechnology, one can focus monoclonal antibodies as a technology. Ever since 1986,
when the first monoclonal antibody was approved by the Food and Drug
Administration for use, therapeutic antibodies have risen to dominate as treatments
for a variety of conditions.180 The global market for antibody treatments was
approximately $150 billion dollars in 2019 and is predicted to rise to $300 billion by
2025.181 To protect such technology with meaningful patent claims is key for the
companies developing these monoclonal therapeutics.
However, different tests have come and gone, including the “newly
characterized antigen” test which was an exception to the written description rules at
the USPTO as applied to antibody claims. This written description test allowed a party
to disclose a newly characterized antigen and claim a genus of antibodies (possibly
including thousands of species), so long as the production of such antibodies was
routine. However, in AbbVie, the Federal Circuit cast aside the “newly characterized
antigen” test for written description and highlighted that functionally defined genus
claims are open to challenge for lack of written description support, especially if the
technology is unpredictable. This is especially so if it is difficult to draw correlations
between structure and function for the genus or to predict what is encompassed by the

See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1366. (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (Linn, J., dissenting in part).
178 Katie Albanese, When Is Enough Enough? What Constitutes Adequate Written Description of
a Genus, 29 FED. CIR. B.J. 343, 358 (2020).
179 See Ariad Pharms., Inc., 598 F.3d at 1350.
180 Monoclonal antibodies are big players on the biotechnology marketplace. As a current
example, drug makers are pivoting to monoclonal antibody treatments for treating COVID-19. The
US FDA granted Emergency Use Authorizations (EUAs) for three anti-SARS-CoV-2 monoclonal
antibody products on December 16, 2021.
181 Ruei-Min Lu et al., Development of Therapeutic Antibodies for the Treatment of Diseases, 27 J.
OF BIOMEDICAL SCI. 1, 1 (2020).
174
175
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functionally claimed genus.182 This opened the gate and now antibody claims are
frequently invalided on both written description and enablement grounds.
For example, in 2022, the court held functional claims, even in the presence of
eleven working examples, lack enablement to an antibody that binds Factor IX, a
protein important for blood clotting.183 Similar as in Amgen v. Sanofi,184 the court noted
antibodies being “inherently unpredictable” and that the only way one could practice
the invention would be by “trial-and-error; i.e., by screening tens of thousands, if not
millions, of candidate antibodies to determine whether they satisfy the limitations of
the asserted claims.”185 As such, the recent decisions in AbbVie,186 Amgen,187 and
Baxalta188 are teaching innovators not to claim antibodies based solely on the target
antigen, specific epitope, and/or function, with some scholars predicting that the scope
of patent protection for therapeutic antibodies will get limited to just those that have
been disclosed in the specification. However, as discussed in part VI, this need not be
the case given the field of art is well developed concerning the structure and function.
Once the inventor maps the variable region sequence and structure, she ought to be
granted broader patent protection than just the specific narrow species of antibody
disclosed.
This fundamental shift in the way the Federal Circuit is interpreting the
statutory requirement is particularly problematic where pharmaceutical and
biotechnological inventions are concerned. For example, claims to a genus of
compounds or to therapeutic antibodies now are required to pass both a non-statutory
“possession” standard for written description that requires the patent application
disclose a “representative number of examples” of the genus; and separately a
numbers-based rigid “full scope” enablement. This rigid formula may work in
predictable arts such as mechanical and electrical, however, it is a bad fit and indeed
harms innovation in the biomedical field. Indeed, this industry-specific barrier to
patentability is not what Congress had in mind. Current jurisprudence concerning
patent disclosure laws run contrary to statutory language and legislative intent and
impose judicially-created additional requirements on patentees that, in practice, have
evolved to target some industries more so than others.
V. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND ENABLEMENT: A RIDDLE, WRAPPED IN A
MYSTERY
Patents are regarded as bargains between inventors and the government. The
government provides exclusivity for a period of time, and the inventor in return
182 AbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co., KG, v. Janssen. Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1300–01 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
183 Baxalta, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00509, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26968, at *64–66
(D. Del. Jan. 13, 2022).
184 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
185 Id.
186 AbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co., KG, v. Janssen. Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
187 Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d at 1086.
188 Baxalta, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00509, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26968 (D. Del. Jan.
13, 2022).
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provides all details of her invention. To obtain a patent for a proposed invention,
certain requirements must be satisfied, including that the idea be useful, 189 novel,190
non-obvious,191 and be fully disclosed.192 The boundary of this disclosure requirement
of a patent application has been debated by judges, scholars and practitioners alike.
The details included in patent applications are critical in demonstrating how well
claims are supported by the patent application (aka the specification). One of the
fundamental issues has been whether the relevant statute of the Patent Act mandates
enablement and written description to be treated as separate requirements. As stated
in Section 112 of the current Patent Act, the statue states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated
by the inventor of carrying out his invention.193
As the structure of the one sentence that comprises this statute evidently
shows, written description and enablement are textually linked together. Although
the Federal Circuit has held enablement and written description to be two separate
requirements, they overlap substantially and when claim scope is analyzed, they
“usually rise and fall together.”194 It is important to point out that that the word
“possession” does not appear in 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).195 Moreover, the Supreme Court
has never interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as mandating separate written description
and enablement requirements. Further still, the Federal Circuit itself did not treat
enablement and written description as separate requirements until it decided Lilly in
1997196 and solidified this view with the Court’s en banc Ariad decision in 2010. 197
Between 1952 when the last Patent Act was enacted and the Federal Circuit’s
1997 decision in Lilly,198 written description was used sparingly to police priority. That
is, the notion of “possession” was used to determine if the specification provided
sufficient support for the claims to demonstrate priority. “Possession” in this context
was a narrow and easy to apply concept, focusing on whether the invention was
described at a particular point in time.199 With its Lilly decision in 1997, the Federal
Circuit split the singular disclosure standard of the statute in two by vastly expanding
the scope of “possession” that historically was narrowly applied to test for support for
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2022).
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2022).
191 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2022).
192 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2022).
193 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022) (emphasis added).
194 LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Vas-Cath
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
195 The judge-created word “possession” is absent from the 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) statute for assessing
compliance with the written description requirement, with all that is required being a written
description that enables.
196 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
197 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
198 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
199 Typically, at the time of filing of the patent application.
189
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new or amended claim language to now be a separate and much broader requirement
for the specification to meet under § 112. In 2010, the Federal Circuit confirmed in
their en banc Ariad decision200 that “possession” is a separate requirement and in an
effort to apply this new principle, the Federal Circuit also came up with varying rigid
subtests to implement it.201
The ill-conceived new and non-statutory “possession” requirement for
demonstrating written description and its varying sub-tests aside, the Federal Circuit
has also upended the doctrine of enablement as it applies to genus claims. Enablement
of the “full scope” of genus claims has also recently been stringently applied when it
comes to genus claims, such that the focus is now on providing a “representative
number of species” even when this is contrary to the textually grounded inquiry. As
the statute provides and as the Federal Circuit has itself in the past interpreted the
statute, the focus ought to be on whether the patent application enables an ordinary
skilled artisan to make and use the invention. The current focus on the outer perimeter
of patent claims and by extension the identification of every species that falls within a
genus to demonstrate what the Federal Circuit calls “full scope” enablement is
misguided. Especially given that identifying every species of a genus has no practical
effect on the ability of an ordinary skilled artisan to make and test an operable species.
35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that the specification of a patent “contain a written
description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in
such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to
make and use the same.”202 The Federal Circuit has flouted this statutory text and
split enablement and written description into two separate requirements.This recent
change in position by the Federal Circuit has resulted in the court following-up and
judicially creating the court’s new “possession” standard and various sub-tests for
written description, plus simultaneously shifting the enablement inquiry from the
well-grounded “undue experimentation” factors to a requirement for patentees to make
and test all the species within a genus and point out which works and which does not.
This is a fundamental shift in approach. 203
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351–52.
These sub-tests are discussed in part V(A), infra.
202 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022); see e.g., Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22; Patent
Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793):
200
201

And be it further enacted, That the grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the
time of granting the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in
writing, containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and
explanations and models (if the nature of the invention or discovery will admit of a
model) of the thing or things, by him or them invented or discovered, and described
as aforesaid, in the said patents; which specification shall be so particular, and said
models so exact, as not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other
things before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled
in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith it may be nearest
connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the public may have
the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term; which specification
shall be filed in the office of the said Secretary, and certified copies thereof, 'shall
be competent evidence in all courts and before all jurisdictions, where any matter
or thing, touching or concerning such patent, right, or privilege, shall come in
question.
203 Patent Act of 1790, supra note 202, at ch. 7, § 2.
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For enablement, the focus should be on how to make and use the invention
without “undue experimentation.” The various factors as discussed in the In re Wands
factors ought to remain at the center of the inquiry, including for example, the nature
of the invention, the predictability of the field of art, and the level of ordinary skill in
the art. When a patent application is drafted, it is in effect directed to people having
ordinary skill in that particular field of art (“PHOSITA”).204 That is, in situations
where one must assess whether a particular patent application is drafted with
disclosure that sufficiently enables a person to make and use what is taught, it is
viewed from the eyes of this PHOSITA.205 This standard for assessing enablement was
supported by the statutory text, and Supreme Court and prior Federal Circuit
decisions, however, the Federal Circuit has dramatically changed course on its
enablement jurisprudence.
The Federal Circuit’s new approach to enablement has become a rigid
numbers-based test to assess if the patent application enables the “full scope” of its
claims.206 Instead of focusing on teaching an ordinary skilled artisan how to make and
use the invention207 and without conducting “undue experimentation,”208 the new
enablement test requires assessing how an ordinary skilled artisan can make and test
every species encompassing a genus. Crucially, under this new scheme, it matters little
how routine this new requirement of checking every species would be. Indeed, the
Patent Act does not mandate any limitations on the number of species falling within a
genus claim or require “full scope” enablement. This new court-created heightened
enablement standard, as discussed in more detail infra in part V(B), lacks any
statutory basis or Supreme Court precedent, and is hurting innovation in the
biomedical industries more so than other industries.
The Federal Circuit has judicially created rules that now make it exceedingly
hard to obtain any meaningful patent protection of a genus claim. This new dramatic
shift in approach to the enablement doctrine and concurrently the extra-statutory
approach to the written description requirement has grown in scope and breadth and
has now become a formidable obstacle to patent validity, especially in the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries. As is developed further infra,209 to
compound this new interpretation of the enablement doctrine being used as a sharp
sword to now routinely invalidate genus claims, the Federal Circuit’s decision to view
enablement as a question of law also is a topic deserving of attention given the
enablement inquiry is so fact-intensive in nature and that the decision to treat it as a
question of law runs against Supreme Court precedent.
The Federal Circuit has argued whether enablement and written description
are separate requirements of the statute in prior decisions. For example, University

PHOSITA stands for “A Person Having Ordinary Skill in The Art.”
A “person of ordinary skill” is one of average skill in the relevant art. See Standard Oil Co. v.
Am. Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 454 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (an ordinary skilled artisan “thinks along the
line of conventional wisdom”); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 420 (2007) (an ordinary
skilled artisan is “a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
206 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
207 As the statute requires.
208 Some experimentation is permissible and does not fail enablement; see e.g., In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731, 739 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (factors for assessing if experimentation would be “undue.”).
209 See part V(C), infra.
204
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of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co. 210 involved pharmaceutical inhibitors for an
enzyme that plays a key role in the inflammatory response, prostaglandin H
synthase-2 (“PGHS-2” or “Cox-2”). The University of Rochester had filed patent
applications directed to methods for screening for inhibitors of cyclooxygenases 1
and 2 (Cox-1 and Cox-2), and the specification disclosed how to make the cells that
express Cox-1 and Cox-2 as well as the assays that can be used to screen for
inhibitors of the two enzymes.
The court held that although the patent application included disclosure to
permit an ordinary skilled artisan to identify compounds that could be used in the
claimed methods,211 the fact that the specification did not actually disclose any
compounds that could be used to practice the claimed methods rendered the patent
invalid.212 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held the patent invalid for failing to satisfy
the written description requirement, which the court interpreted to be a separate
requirement to enablement under § 112.213 And yet, although the patent was held
invalid for failing to comply with the written description requirement, the patent
application enabled an ordinary skilled artisan to not only derive the compounds
using the disclosed methods, but also to perform the claimed methods.
This decision to interpret the first paragraph of § 112 as requiring a double
requirement of enablement separate from written description has been especially
devastating and harmful to patents within the pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries for reasons developed infra.214 Even in more recent cases from the Federal
Circuit, one can see the disagreement between judges on whether enablement and
written description are separate requirements. For example, the disagreement
between Judge Lourie and dissenting Judge Rader is demonstrated in their
positions in Enzo.215 To be clear, under such a dual standard favored by Judge Lourie
and the majority, many pharmaceutical and biotechnology patents are invalid,
whereas if the first paragraph of § 112 is interpreted to require inventors disclose
and enable their invention (i.e. a single requirement, focusing on a written
description that enables),216 the patent in Rochester and many like it would survive
such invalidity challenges.
The conflation of enablement and written description continues to this day,
with some courts using the written description requirement to invalidate claims that
are broader than the invention the applicant “possessed” upon filing, even if the
claims were not amended during prosecution. Applied in this way, the written
description requirement overlaps substantially with the enablement requirement.
Recent cases have cemented the Federal Circuit’s stance that a) the enablement
and written description of the invention are two separate requirements;217 b) to
satisfy the enablement requirement of genus claims, a rigid numbers-based
evaluation is needed to determine whether the patent application enables the “full
Univ. of Rochester v. GD Searle & Co., Inc., 358 F.3d 916, 918–20 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Id. at 919.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 927.
214 See part V(A).
215 Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Id. at 976 (Rader, J.,
dissenting).
216 Id.
217 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
210
211
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scope” of its claims (that is, evaluating how an ordinary skilled artisan can make
and test every species encompassing a genus, no matter how routine a practice that
would be);218 and c) to satisfy the written description requirement, the application
must show the judicially-created “possession” of the invention and this in turn
depends on satisfying various court-created sub-tests, including the popular
“representative number of species.”219 These judicially-created rules lack any basis
in statutory text and Supreme Court precedent, and seriously threaten innovation
in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology fields.
The Idenix v. Gilead decision is another recent example. Here, the Federal
Circuit held patent claims to methods for treating Hepatitis C Virus (“HCV”) by
administering certain compounds as being invalid on both enablement and written
description grounds, under 35 U.S.C. § 112.220 The court held that the patent claims
covered “tens if not hundreds of thousands” of antiviral compounds, and yet the patent
application failed to provide guidance on which of those compounds would actually
work to treat HCV.221 Although Idenix argued that the patent application’s four
working examples were enough to comply with the enablement requirement, 222 the
court rejected this argument and pointed out that the field of art was unpredictable
and therefore an ordinary skilled artisan would not know which compounds would
work for their intended purpose. The court also found that the inventors were not “in
possession” of their claimed invention and therefore the patent was also held invalid
based on its failure to comply with the written description requirement.
The reasoning behind this recent decision was also based on an earlier case in
which the Federal Circuit similarly held that a claim covering thousands of compounds
was invalid for lack of enablement as a matter of law. 223 Moreover, in August of 2021,
the Federal Circuit found Sloan Kettering’s Juno patent claims to a nucleic acid
polymer (DNA/RNA) that encodes for a particular “chimeric T cell receptor” as being
invalid for lack of written description.224 This technology relates to the revolutionary
CAR T-Cell therapy where a patient’s own T-Cells are genetically modified so that they
can then recognize and kill specific antigens. This technology, for which its two
inventors were awarded the 2018 Nobel prize in Physiology or Medicine, culminated
in the first personalized cellular therapy for cancer, treating blood cancers such as
leukemia and lymphoma.225 The patent claims are directed to coding for a “binding
element that specifically interacts with a selected target” in the form of a single chain

218 Baxalta, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-00509, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26968, at *64–66
(D. Del. Jan. 13, 2022); Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Sci. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1234 (2021); Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed.
Cir. 2021); AbbVie Deutschland GMBH & Co., KG, v. Janssen. Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2014); Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1385–86 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
219 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Ariad, 598
F.3d at 1349.
220 Idenix Pharms., 941 F.3d at 1162–63.
221 Id. at 1164.
222 Id. at 1161.
223 Wyeth, 720 F.3d at 1386.
224 Juno Therapeutics, Inc. v. Kite Pharma, Inc., 10 F.4th 1330, 1339–40 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
225 Mary Caffrey, Nobel Prize Recognizes Discoveries with T Cells in Immunotherapy, AM. J.
MANAGED CARE (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.ajmc.com/view/nobel-prize-recognizes-discoveries-with-tcells-in-immunotherapy.
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antibody. Because the patent application failed to disclose the DNA sequence of such
a binding element, the claim was found to lack written description.226
In this recent case, the Federal Circuit confirmed that the only time functional
claiming of a genus can meet the written description requirement is where the
specification either explains structural features that are common between members of
the species that fall within the genus so that a person of ordinary skill in the art
(“PHOSITA”) can recognize the genus, or the specification provides “a representative
number of species” that fall within the scope of the genus. 227 In this case, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that “no reasonable jury could find the ’190
patent’s written description sufficiently demonstrates that the inventors possessed the
full scope of the claimed invention.” 228 In particular, in Juno,229 the court held that even
if two embodiments were disclosed that fell within the scope of the genus, the
specification failed to provide details about their commonality to allow a PHOSITA to
recognize all the members of the genus.
Separate to these new requirements for enabling genus claims, the nonstatutory written description doctrine has grown in scope and the contours of this
separate requirement also remain unclear for genus claims. In particular, to comply
with the written description requirement, the Federal Circuit demands that genus
claims be articulated to show a “representative number of species” within that
genus.230 The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) suggests that this
showing then depends on whether an ordinary skilled artisan would recognize that the
patentee was “in possession of the necessary common attributes or features possessed
by the members of the genus”231 and yet the MPEP also cautions patentees that
individual support for each of the species within a genus is unpracticable and
unnecessary.232 To appreciate when a patentee is “in possession” of her invention
depends on whether an ordinary skilled artisan would understand the patentee to be
in possession of her invention. From a litigation perspective, disclosure of a single
species in a patent application can render a patent claim to a genus invalid.233
These recent cases from the Federal Circuit, as well as requirements outlined
in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s Manual of Patent Examining Procedure,
make it clear that drafting viable genus claims is becoming exceedingly difficult to do.
Namely, when a genus encompasses a large number of species, one is faced with the
question of how best to comply with the now very stringent enablement laws for genus
claims. This exceedingly high bar that has now been set for pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies has resulted in unintended consequences and is presently

Id.
Id.
228 Juno Therapeutics, Inc., 10 F.4th at 1336 (emphasis added).
229 Id.
230 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, 872 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (To show possession, the court
“requires a precise definition” of the invention, which for a genus claim, a patentee must disclose “a
representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus or structural features common
to the members of the genus so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of
the genus.”); see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
231 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2163(II)(A)(3)(a)(i).
232 MPEP, supra note 24, § 2163(II)(A)(3)(a)(ii).
233 AbbVie Deutschland GmbH & Co. v. Janssen Biotech, Inc., 759 F.3d 1285, 1300 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
226
227
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and will in the future impede biomedical innovation in the U.S. In particular, the
hardening and rigid nature of the Federal Circuit’s position on genus claims has
consequences not only for protecting small molecule pharmaceuticals, as demonstrated
by the Idenix case,234 but also implicates biologics as demonstrated by the Amgen
case,235 since genus claims are routinely used when drafting claims to biologics (e.g.
claims to a genus of antibodies). Yet, as is explored in part VI, there is hope for this
impasse to play out in a meaningful way for all stakeholders.
A. The Rigid Written Description Sub-Tests are Untenable and Hinder Innovation of
New Therapeutics
The written description’s function is focused firstly on providing adequate
description of the invention to satisfy the aforementioned quid pro quo where the
government provides limited monopoly for a full description of the invention;236 second
to assure that the inventor “possessed” the claimed invention when the application was
filed;237 and third to police against addition of new matter being added that expands
and is outside of the scope of the original patent filing.238
The Federal Circuit’s “possession” standard runs afoul of the statutory text of
35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The court first rejected the statutory standard for “written
description of the invention,”239 and instead created its own test centering on a finding
of “whether the disclosure of the application reasonably conveys that the inventor had
possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”240 Interestingly, this test
or possession standard appears nowhere in the statute, § 112(a). Within the field of
patent law and in a message to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court recently
demanded “that courts should not read into the patent laws limitations and conditions
which the legislature has not expressed.”241 However, not only has the Federal Circuit
done just that, but in order to interpret and apply their view of the statutory language,
the Court has had to formulate and update their own judicially-created sub-tests as
follow-on creations to their judicially-created, non-statutory extra requirement to
demonstrate written description.
While the enablement doctrine has been developed by the courts and can be
traced back to the early 1900s, its related close cousin – the written description
requirement – is a relative newcomer that appeared over 140 years later.242 The Patent
Act of 1952 did not contain a “written description” requirement apart from enablement.
Instead, the addition of “new matter” to pending patent applications was a parallel
requirement and prohibited under 35 U.S.C. § 132. In the key In re Ruschig decision
Id.
Id.
236 Id.
237 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
238 Id.
239 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022) (emphasis added).
240 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
241 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010).
242 In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (“Consider a case where the
specification discusses only compound A and contains no broadening language of any kind. This might
very well enable one skilled in the art to make and use compounds B and C; yet the class consisting
of A, B and C has not been described.”).
234
235
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from the 1960s, the court for the first time created the link between prohibition against
adding “new matter” to pending patent applications and the “written description”
requirement.243
A claim to a genus that is in a nascent field in which there is little prior art to
use to bridge gaps is susceptible to violating the written description requirement.244
Moreover, the level of disclosure is key itself, as the Federal Circuit has held that
describing only a single species usually violates the written description requirement.245
In Ariad, the Federal Circuit made clear that when broad genus claims cannot rely on
the prior art, the patent application should include either “structural features common
to the members of the genus” or “a representative number of species” within the
genus.246
Although focusing on providing a “representative number of species” sounds
reasonable and can help as a focal starting point, it is not without problems as a subtest
because, for example, it remains unclear how the “representative number” would be
determined. This problem is also compounded by the fact that post Ariad, it remains
unclear what the boundaries are for complying with the written description
requirement, in large part because the guidance provided points to what is not required
and not what is. For example, the written description of patent applications does not
require examples,247 recitation of known structure,248 reduction to practice,249 nor any
particular form of disclosure.250 As such, the Federal Circuit has not actually provided
any positive guidance to patentees regarding what is required to satisfy the written
description requirement. Indeed, a reasonable idea contemplated by some on the
patent bar would be to eliminate the written description doctrine251 and focus more on
enablement and clarity sections of the Patent Act.252
Having created the non-statutory “possession” standard for written
description, the Federal Circuit developed several sub-tests in an effort to apply and
make sense of its non-statutory “possession” standard. For example, the
243 Prior to In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967), not a single case from the C.C.P.A. had
considered “written description” under 35 U.S.C. § 112, to be anything other than a modifier of the
enablement requirement. See e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(“With respect to the first paragraph of § 112 the severability of its ‘written description’ provision from
its enablement (‘make and use’) provision was recognized . . . as early as In re Ruschig.”).
244 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1125–27. But see Capon v.
Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reliance on prior art as prior art contained “extensive
knowledge of the nucleotide structure”).
245 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Capon v. Eshhar,
418 F.3d 1349, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Boston Sci. Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1366–
67 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Billups-Rothenberg, Inc. v. Associated Reg’l & Univ. Pathologists, Inc., 642 F.3d
1031, 1037 (2011).
246 Ariad, 595 F.3d at 1350.
247 Id.at 1352.
248 Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
249 Streck, Inc. v. Rsch. & Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 665 F.3d 1269, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
250 Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d 1115, 1122 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
251 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting in part) (Judge Rader dissenting in part,
criticizing the en banc majority’s holding that § 112 contains two separate requirements for writtendescription and enablement); see Allen K. Yu, The En Banc Federal Circuit’s Written Description
Requirement: Time for the Supreme Court to Reverse Again?, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 895, 964–66 (2012).
252 Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 545,
586–96 (2012).
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“representative number of species” test, the “structure-function” test, and the
“common-structural-features” test were created. These sub-tests have even varied
depending on the technology; for example, the three sub-tests to assess if a patent
application had complied with the written description of a genus claim to biologics such
as antibodies, include (i) the “fully characterized antigen” sub-test, (ii) the “common
structural features” sub-test, and (iii) the “representative number of examples” subtest. However, the Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence has evolved, and the
“representative number of examples” sub-test is now the most favored.
As well as creating sub-tests in an attempt to apply the non-statutory
“possession” test for written description, the Federal Circuit has held that to establish
“possession,” the patent application must include a “precise definition” of the claimed
invention “such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties.” 253
For genus claims, the court in Ariad goes on to state that this precise definition is
required to include “either a representative number of species falling within the scope
of the genus or structural features common to the members of the genus so that one of
skill in the art can visualize or recognize the members of the genus.” 254
The key takeaway, however, is that none of these subtests or precise definitions
have any statutory basis in the text of § 112(a). Moreover, in direct contrast, the
Supreme Court has previously held genus claims valid and in compliance with § 112(a)
even when the patent claim encompassed “a large class of substances and the range of
treatment within the terms of the claims.”255 It is for this reason that commentators
have mentioned that these non-statutory requirements for showing “possession”
impose heightened burdens on inventors, especially those in the biomedical field, not
found under the statute.256
One problem with the Federal Circuit’s recent 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) jurisprudence
is some industries in which genus claiming strategies are prevalent have been unjustly
targeted and negatively impacted by this change in law and the heightened new
standard necessary to comply with the statute. For example, if the claim covers a genus
of pharmaceutical compounds, “possession” may be demonstrated by disclosure of
either “a representative number of species” within the scope of the claims or by
showing “structural features common to the members of the genus.” 257 This judiciallycreated standard is not what the statute requires; instead, this new judge-made
standard requires patent applications to disclose additional and different information
from what is necessary for a person of ordinary skill in the art to understand what the
invention is and how to make and use it.
The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the statute runs afoul of the
statute, its legislative history, and also conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.258
The court’s dramatic change in position for interpreting the language of § 112 and
its current application of the “representative number of examples” sub-test for
showing the court-created, extra-statutory “possession” requirement for

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350.
255 Minerals Separation Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S. 261, 271 (1916).
256 Harold C. Wegner, The Disclosure Requirements of the 1952 Patent Act: Looking Back and a
New Statute for the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243 (2004).
257 Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350.
258 See part II, supra.
253
254
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demonstrating written description have created immense practical problems for
stakeholders in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries and this has
significantly hindered innovation in this field in recent years. In practice, the rigid
and expansive written description doctrine has been too high a bar to meet and is
viewed by many stakeholders in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry
as a non-statutory, judge-created obstruction to fostering innovation of new
therapeutics to meet patient needs.259
B. The Patent Act Does Not Require “Full Scope” Enablement
The Federal Circuit has not only flouted statutory text and added their own
new “possession” standard for written description, but the court has also gone awry on
the enablement requirement of this statute. That is, the Federal Circuit has of late
adopted a rigid numbers-based test to evaluate “full scope” enablement that focuses on
evaluating how an ordinary skilled artisan can make and test every species
encompassing a genus no matter how routine a practice that would be, instead of
focusing on whether any “undue” experimentation would be required to make and test
the species.260 This change in approach away from the well-established “undue
experimentation” factors that the court had devised previously to a requirement for
patentees to now make and test all of the species within a genus and highlight which
species works and which does not, is a fundamental shift in approach. 261 This
heightened enablement is a significant shift in approach which has devastated the
pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries because of their unique reliance on genus
claims.262
When Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, the statute clearly mandated that the
patent specification “enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” to “make
and use the same.” To satisfy the enablement requirement, the courts require that the
disclosure of the patent be “commensurate in scope” with what the patent claim is
attempting to capture.263 Indeed, if a patentee decides to pursue broad patent claims,
arguably a more valuable right, the law requires that the disclosure be sufficient to
support and enable that wider claim scope.264
The statutory foundation for the enablement requirement dates back over 200
years, and yet enablement as a doctrine was developed by judicial interpretation of the
statute.265 Under the rubric developed and long established by the courts, the
259

2013).

See e.g., Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS, 723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir.

In re Wands, 858 F. 2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
enablement requirement is satisfied if, given what they already know, the specification teaches those
in the art enough that they can make and use the invention.”) (emphasis added).
262 It is also noteworthy that some noted scholars have recently commented that this approach
towards enablement marks “a categorical shift in thinking away from teaching the PHOSITA and
towards a precise delineation of the boundaries of the claim.” Karshtedt et al., supra note 1, at 4. .
263 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“What is necessary
is that the applicant provide a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the
invention commensurate with the scope of the claims.”).
264 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A patentee who chooses
broad claim language must make sure the broad claims are fully enabled.”).
265 See part II, supra.
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specification is found to be enabled only if upon balancing of the In re Wands factors a
PHOSITA could make and use the invention without undue experimentation. 266 As
follow-on decisions highlighted, “to enable any person skilled in the art” means
“without requiring undue experimentation.”267
However, it is bad enough that the Federal Circuit’s decision to flout statutory
text and split enablement and written description into two separate requirements and
the ensuing instability that resulted from this new judicially created “possession”
standard for written description and its related various sub-tests, but the court has
also gone significantly awry on the enablement requirement of this statute. For a long
time prior to the recent dramatic shift in the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on
enablement, the well-established “undue experimentation” factors were used as a
central feature for determining a specification’s compliance with the enablement
requirement.268 This framework correctly identifies that the enablement analysis is
case-specific and that any imposition of arbitrary bright-line rules cause problems.
However, the Federal Circuit’s move away from the well-established “undue
experimentation” factors to a requirement for patentees to now make and test all of
the species within a genus and highlight which species works and which does not, is a
fundamental shift in approach. 269 That is, the problem with the current enablement
jurisprudence, as articulated by the Federal Circuit, is the fact that it has become a
rigid numbers-based test to evaluate whether the patent application enables the “full
scope” of its claims.270 This test has evolved to incorrectly focus on evaluating how an
ordinary skilled artisan can make and test every species encompassing a genus, no
matter how routine a practice that would be. And yet, as the court has previously
outlined, enablement does not require an ordinary skilled artisan to make and test
every possible substitution to exclude hypothetical outliers that do not work.271 Indeed,
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) of the Patent Act does not mandate any limitations on the number
of species falling within a genus claim or require “full scope” enablement. This new
court-created heightened enablement, as discussed in part III and IV, has devastated
the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries because it is an impossible
requirement to meet for genus claims of any size in these biomedical industries.272 This
effective prohibition on genus claims that cover “too large” a number of compounds
lacks any basis in statutory text of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or Supreme Court precedent.
The genesis of this numbers-focused enablement requirement can be found in
Wyeth.273 In that case, the patent claimed use of a “class of compounds” to treat
restenosis (re-narrowing of blood vessel after angioplasty to open the blood vessel). The
266
267

(2022).

Id.
Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 35 U.S.C. § 112

268 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
enablement requirement is satisfied if, given what they already know, the specification teaches those
in the art enough that they can make and use the invention”) (emphasis added); see also In re Vaeck,
947 F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
269 Id.
270 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
271 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
272 Many patent claims have been rendered invalid based on this recent chance in the enablement
jurisprudence by the Federal Circuit. See e.g., Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,
723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
273 Wyeth & Cordis Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 720 F.3d 1380, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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patent application disclosed only one species that was encompassed within the genus.
During litigation to enforce the genus patent claim against a rival who had made a
different species, the Federal Circuit held the claim invalid for failing the enablement
requirement. The court considered key as to “whether having to synthesize and screen
each of at least tens of thousands of candidate compounds” defeats enablement and
answered in the affirmative.274 What made the case even more unusual was the fact
that the court held the claims non-enabled while “accept[ing] as true Wyeth’s claims
about the state of the art” and that one of ordinary skill could routinely screen
candidate compounds for the desired effect.275
The Federal Circuit continued its recent jurisprudence on enablement and
built off its decision in Wyeth and used the recent Idenix decision to effectively kill off
and undermine the practice of genus claiming in biopharma patent practice. The
Federal Circuit in Idenix drew on Wyeth and overturned a jury verdict that upheld the
claims, affirming a district court’s finding that the genus claims were not enabled as a
matter of law.276 Here, a divided panel held patent claims directed to methods for
treating Hepatitis C Virus (“HCV”) by administering compounds was invalid for failing
both the enablement and the written description requirements under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112.277 The court drew on its earlier Wyeth case, to find that the claims captured
“tens if not hundreds of thousands” of compounds, and that the patent application
provided minimal guidance on which compounds would work to treat HCV. 278 Even
though the patent specification included four working examples, the court held that
the claims failed the enablement requirement.
And yet, it is a mistake to think that the full-scope assessment depends on how
long a person of ordinary skill in the art would take to make and test all the species
encompassed by a genus. That is not the statutory test. Genus claims that have
thousands of species within them, for example genus claims in pharmaceutical or
biotechnology patents, have been found to be enabled in view of patent disclosures that
have not identified every species encompassed by a genus.279 As the Federal Circuit
has outlined, a patent application is “not required to provide a detailed recipe for
preparing every conceivable . . . or . . . permutations of that compound.”280 Indeed, in a
well-established case, In re Wands,281 the genus claim covered an immunoassay
method using monoclonal antibodies directed to a hepatitis B antigen. Although an
ordinary skilled artisan would have had to engage in extensive amount of
experimentation, the court held the claim was enabled because the specification
included considerable direction, guidance, and working examples. The enablement
requirement was satisfied, even where extensive routine experimentation was needed
to practice the invention.

Id. at 1385.
Id.; Enzo Life Scis., Inc. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 928 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
276 Idenix Pharms. LLC v. Gilead Scis. Inc., 941 F.3d 1149, 1165 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
277 Id.
278 Id. at 1164.
279 In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 501–02 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
280 Pfizer Inc. v. Teva Pharms. U.S.A., Inc., 555 F. App’x. 961, 967 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (a patent
specification is not required to “describe how to make and use every possible variant”; “the artisan's
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps”).
281 Id.
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A new Federal Circuit approach to § 112(a) is required that is a flexible and
adaptable test, and not the current rigid rules that focus on “representative number of
examples” sub-test for the written description’s non-statutory “possession”
requirement, and “full scope” enablement that requires every species within a genus
to be made and tested. Since determinations on compliance with these § 112(a)
requirements are fact-intensive, including determining the ordinary skilled person’s
knowledge, the amount of guidance provided by the patent application and the nature
of the field of invention, it also is questionable at best why enablement is treated as a
question of law whereas written description is treated as a question of fact. Having
such rigid judicially-invented rules has unintended consequences, namely in this
instance on the validity of vast number of valuable genus claims in pharmaceutical
and biotechnology patents as district courts around the nation have been bound by the
Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence concerning § 112(a).
As is discussed in the next and final section, part VI, a flexible and contextspecific standard is required to interpret § 112(a). To have the current rigid tests as
outlined above be the only test for enablement, or the only test for written description,
is wrong. Much like when the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid
“teaching, suggest, or motivation” test for obviousness, 282 and the rigid “machine or
transformation” test for patent eligibility,283 the Federal Circuit’s current numbersbased enablement inquiry to determine “full scope” enablement, or the “representative
number of examples” inquiry for written description, should be struck down as too rigid
and extra-statutory and because these tests within the § 112(a) inquiry do not
represent the sole tests. Rather, instead of striking down the current tests, the
currently adopted tests can instead be regarded as merely providing “a useful and
important clue,”284 as provided for by the recent Supreme Court cases in KSR and
Bilski.285
C. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) Requires a Fact-Intensive Jury Inquiry
35 U.S.C. § 112(a) requires that the “written description” of a patent
specification must include “such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected,
to make and use the same.”286 The Supreme Court has previously held that “it is the
right of the jury to determine . . . whether the specifications . . . were so precise as to
enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make the invention described.”287 A key
reason for this being that fact-intensive determinations such as, whether an ordinary
skilled artisan would appreciate the similarities between species within a genus claim
typically involve question of fact for juries to decide.
The Federal Circuit decided for the first time in 1983, against Supreme Court
precedent, that enablement is a question of law. 288 This has carried through and today
enablement is a question of law for the court to decide. And yet, one cannot divorce
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010).
284 Id. at 604.
285 Id.
286 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2022).
287 Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 74, 85 (1854).
288 Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 960 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
282
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enablement determinations from inherently factual questions, including, critically, the
knowledge of the ordinary skilled artisan in the relevant field of art, the nature and
maturity of the field of the invention, and how much guidance the patent application
provides. The enablement inquiry depends on determining if experimentation is
“undue” and there is an eight-factor test that is used to assess if an ordinary skilled
artisan would be required to perform “undue experimentation” in order to practice the
invention.289
Even in the context of such intensive factual inquiries, the Federal Circuit’s
current view is that determining whether “undue experimentation” is required is a
question of law.290 However, these eight factors require expert testimony and weighing
evidence related to the eight factors. Such analysis is typically a function reserved for
the jury – i.e., a question of fact and not a question of law. In addition, it remains a
puzzle as to why juries routinely resolve enablement issues when enablement is a
question of law,291 and if juries do make determinations on whether “undue
experimentation” would be necessary, why are judges given the permit to discard
juries’ findings? That is, although the settled view has been that enablement is a fact
issue according to Supreme Court precedent, the specter of having enablement be
decided as a legal question means judges are able to set aside validity determinations
and reweigh the facts.
The Supreme Court has long recognized enablement as a question of fact,
stating that it is “the right of the jury to determine” whether a specification is sufficient
to “enable any person skilled in the [art] . . . to make the [invention] described.”292
Moreover, it is noteworthy to mention that while the enablement requirement’s close
cousin - “written description” requirement - from the very same sentence of § 112 is
treated as a question of fact, the Federal Circuit considers the enablement inquiry as
a question of law. This position runs against the statute and Supreme Court precedent.
Perhaps most importantly, in practice, this move has been felt and had a significant
impact because the Federal Circuit effectively took the jury’s role and handed it to the
judges to decide, to the detriment of society and settled law. As such, for at least this
additional reason, the enablement doctrine is ripe for correction, so that stability can
return to patent laws and the growth of innovation, especially in the biomedical field,
can be fostered.
VI. FIXING 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)
As outlined supra, the status of current laws concerning § 112 has not been
technology-neutral. In particular, the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries
have been greatly harmed by the Federal Circuit’s presently applied rigid approach to
§ 112(a), whereby genus claims that cover too many compounds fail the enablement
requirement, and by requiring a separate written description to show the inventor was
289 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“Whether undue experimentation is needed
is not a single, simple factual determination, but rather is a conclusion reached by weighing many
factual considerations.”).
290 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharms. U.S.A., Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
291 AIPLA
Model Patent Jury Instructions (2018), https://www.aipla.org/docs/defaultsource/default-document-library/2018-07-23-clean---aipla-model-patent-juryinstructions.pdf?sfvrsn=8664a8dd_0.
292 Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 74, 85 (1854).

[21:121:22]

Eviscerating Patent Scope

161

“in possession” of the compounds upon patent filing. One approach to fix the problem
with the current status quo concerning § 112 would be to treat the statute as requiring
a singular requirement and make determinations on violations or compliance of the
statute on a case by case, flexible and context-specific manner. Moreover, the Federal
Circuit’s labeling of enablement as a question of law has resulted in the court creating
rigid tests without any statutory authority. It is noteworthy that enablement in the
same sentence of the § 112(a) statute is treated as a question of law, whereas written
description requirement from the same sentence is treated as a question of fact.
Instead of embracing the current atextual tests for enablement and written
description, a simpler approach would be to follow statutory language and ask the
factfinder whether the patent application has described the invention and the “manner
and process of making and using it . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains to make and use the
same.”293
A. Flexible Approach Necessary For “Full Scope” Enablement
The boundary of intellectual property that an inventor desires to capture as
her invention is listed in a patent’s claims.294 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
and the courts have long been aware that an inventor’s claims may attempt to capture
more than the inventor has disclosed in the patent application. The statute, 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(a), of the Patent Act focuses on the disclosure requirements for a patent. In
particular, when an innovator obtains a patent and with it the exclusivity to stop
others from practicing the invention for a period of time, the innovator is required,
under § 112(a), to provide an enabling disclosure of the invention.
When Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 112, the statute clearly mandated that the
patent specification “enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains” to “make
and use the same.” To satisfy the enablement requirement, the courts require that the
disclosure of the patent be “commensurate in scope” with what the patent claim is
attempting to capture.295 Indeed, if a patentee decides to pursue broad patent claims,
arguably a more valuable right, the law requires that the disclosure be sufficient to
support and enable that wider claim scope.296
The statutory foundation for the enablement requirement dates back over 200
years, however, enablement as a doctrine was developed by judicial interpretation of
the statute.297 Under the rubric developed and long established by the courts, the
specification is found to be enabled only if upon balancing of the In re Wands factors a
PHOSITA could make and use the invention without undue experimentation.298 This
rubric became the accepted norm for assessing enablement, with decisions after In re
35 U.S.C. §112(a) (2022).
In re Warmerdam, 33 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“It is the claims which define the metes
and bounds of the invention entitled to the protection of the patent system.”).
295 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“What is necessary
is that the applicant provide a disclosure sufficient to enable one skilled in the art to carry out the
invention commensurate with the scope of the claims.”).
296 Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, 516 F.3d 993, 999 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“A patentee who chooses
broad claim language must make sure the broad claims are fully enabled.”).
297 See part II, supra.
298 Id.
293
294
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Wands consistently stating “to enable any person skilled in the art” means “without
requiring undue experimentation.”299
However, not only has the Federal Circuit flouted statutory text and split
enablement and written description into two separate requirements and caused
instability because of their new “possession” standard and various sub-tests for written
description, but the court has also gone significantly awry on the now separate
enablement requirement of this statute. Prior to the recent dramatic shift in the
Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on enablement, the well-established “undue
experimentation” factors were used as a central feature for determining a
specification’s compliance with the enablement requirement.300 This framework
correctly identifies that the enablement analysis is case-specific and that any
imposition of arbitrary bright-line rules cause problems.
However, the Federal Circuit’s move away from the well-established “undue
experimentation” factors to a requirement for patentees to now make and test all of
the species within a genus and highlight which species works and which does not, is a
fundamental shift in approach. 301 That is, the problem with the current enablement
jurisprudence, as articulated by the Federal Circuit, is the fact that it has become a
rigid numbers-based test to evaluate whether the patent application enables the “full
scope” of its claims.302 This test has evolved to incorrectly focus on evaluating how an
ordinary skilled artisan can make and test every species encompassing a genus, no
matter how many species there are within the genus and how routine a practice that
would be.
And yet, as the court has previously outlined, enablement does not require an
ordinary skilled artisan to make and test every possible substitution to exclude
hypothetical outliers that do not work.303 Indeed, 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) of the Patent Act
does not mandate any limitations on the number of species falling within a genus claim
or require “full scope” enablement. This new court-created heightened enablement has
devastated the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industries because it is an
impossible requirement to meet for genus claims of any size in the biomedical
industry.304 This effective prohibition on genus claims that cover “too large” a number
of compounds lacks any basis in statutory text of 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) or Supreme Court
precedent.
A new Federal Circuit approach to § 112(a) is required, one that is a flexible
and adaptable test. The current rigid rules are proving devastating to the
biopharmaceutical industry because they focus on “representative number of
examples” sub-test for the written description’s non-statutory “possession”
299

(2022).

Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech Labs., Inc., 429 F.3d 1052, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 2005); 35 U.S.C. § 112

300 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The
enablement requirement is satisfied if, given what they already know, the specification teaches those
in the art enough that they can make and use the invention”) (emphasis added); see In re Vaeck, 947
F.2d 488, 495 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
301 Id.
302 Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC, 987 F.3d 1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
303 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
304 Many patent claims have been rendered invalid based on this recent chance in the enablement
jurisprudence by the Federal Circuit. See e.g., Novozymes A/S v. DuPont Nutrition Biosciences APS,
723 F.3d 1336, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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requirement, and “full scope” enablement that requires every species within a genus
to be made and tested. Since determinations on compliance with these § 112(a)
requirements are fact-intensive, including determining the ordinary skilled person’s
knowledge, the amount of guidance provided by the patent application and the nature
of the field of invention, having such rigid rules have unintended consequences,
dooming genus claims of many high value biopharma patents as invalid. The current
rigid tests cannot be the sole test for enablement, and similarly, the current
“possession” subtest cannot be the sole test for written description. Much like when the
Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid “teaching, suggest, or motivation”
test for obviousness,305 and the rigid “machine or transformation” test for patent
eligibility,306 the Federal Circuit’s current numbers-based enablement inquiry as well
as the “representative number of examples” inquiry for written description should be
struck down as too rigid and because they do not represent the sole tests. Thus, there
is present need for a new standard or interpreting § 112(a) of the Patent Act.
B. Returning to a Single Section 112(a) Standard – A Written Description that
Enables
If history is any judge, we have seen the Federal Circuit create its own
tests for interpreting other areas of patent law, only for the test to apply too
narrowly and rigidly. For example, the “teaching, suggestion and motivation”
(TSM) test became the only test for assessing obviousness of a patent application
and the Supreme Court disagreed with such a rigid, formulaic interpretation of
Section 103 obviousness law in KSR. Although the Court did not significantly
change the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on obviousness, they did make a note
to say that the TSM test is not the sole test for obviousness and that the Federal
Circuit was wrong to apply their own TSM test so rigidly.307 In another recent
Supreme Court case involving yet another aspect of patent law, Section 101, the
Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rigid “machine or transformation” as the only
test for determining patent eligibility in Bilski.308 Having taken action to make
Sections 101 and 103 of the Patent Act more predictable, giving both a more
flexible test, the Supreme Court ought to tackle Section 112 to also strike down in
similar fashion the rigid approach used to test for Section 112 compliance.
A flexible and context-specific standard is required to interpret § 112(a).
As discussed supra, such a flexible approach to § 112 is key to bringing more
predictability and calm to an area of patent law that is in flux to the detriment of
many stakeholders in the biotech and pharmaceutical industries. The Federal
Circuit’s often used narrow and inflexible “representative number of examples”
sub-test to determine compliance with the written description requirement is
proving unworkable and, in practice, a test that has decidedly negatively targeted
one industry over others.309 Just as the Supreme Court did to change the rigid
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010).
307 Id.
308 Id. at 603 (“. . . is not the sole test.”).
309 Scholars, practitioners and judges alike have previously remarked Biotechnology and
Pharmaceutical industries as being targeted much more than other industries such as mechanical
and electrical that are more “predictable.”
305
306
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stance of the Federal Circuit’s position on their own devised obviousness laws in
KSR, and also similar to the Supreme Court’s stance to reject a rigid inquiry for
determining patent eligible subject matter in Bilski, this current issue concerning
§ 112 is ripe to address by a future Supreme Court decision. The goal ought to be
the creation of a flexible, multi-pronged, context-specific § 112(a) inquiry. It is
perhaps indirectly noteworthy that the Supreme Court has recently emphasized
adherence to the Patent Act’s text, without adding any “rigid and mandatory
formulas,”310 or any additional requirements that would be “inconsistent with the
text and the statute’s purpose and design.”311
What is clear is that the rigid application of the “representative number
of examples” sub-test by the Federal Circuit as the only test for determining if a
patent application has complied with the written description requirement is a
mistake. Language could be taken from the Supreme Court’s two recent decisions
that aimed to nullify rigid patent law rules to, for example, indicate that the
current test can help in the § 112 analysis as “a useful and important clue,” but
“not [as] the sole test.”312 Also, although disclosing working examples may provide
a helpful insight in some situations, “helpful insights . . . need not become rigid
and mandatory formulas” as the Supreme Court outlined.313
Prior to the Federal Circuit’s recent detour on its § 112(a) jurisprudence,
this approach was used for analyzing § 112(a) for both enablement and written
description. In particular, a more holistic and flexible manner was used, for
example, to recognize that “the ‘written description’ requirement must be applied
in the context of the particular invention and the state of the knowledge.”314 Here,
the context of the nature of the technology, its maturity, predictability, the
breadth of the claims and the level of skill of the ordinary person were all
considered as important factors, with no factor being dispositive, for both written
description and enablement. Under this multi-pronged analysis, the written
description and enablement determinations are subsumed into one test as
required by the statute.
The key factors used to analyze enablement, the Wands factors, include a
similar list that aims to provide a context-specific multi factor test. For example,
whereas “presence of working examples” factors into determining whether a
patent claim is enabled under the Wands factors, the “representative number of
examples” sub-test from Regents and Ariad cases is similarly used to determine
whether a patent claim complies with the written description requirement. The
overlap here is clear, with Judge Linn going as far as saying that the Capon
factors for written description “mirror the Wands factors for enablement.”315 This
comes as no great surprise, given that both enablement and written description
have their roots in 35 U.S.C. § 112 and closely overlap each other in practice.

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
Bilski, 561 U.S. at 603.
312 Id. at 604.
313 KSR, 550 U.S. at 419.
314 Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1358–59 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
315 Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Linn, J.,
dissenting).
310
311
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An option for law makers to consider is to return to the statutory text and
Supreme Court precedent by recognizing § 112(a) as a unitary requirement for a
written description of the invention and of the manner of making and using it.
This interpretation of the statute aligns with both the language of the statute and
the purpose of the disclosure requirement.316 A singular approach to assessing
these two highly overlapping features of 35 U.S.C. § 112 is necessary, one test that
ought to be created and applied in a flexible, multi-pronged, context-specific
manner. This could perhaps take the form of collapsing the Capon factors for
determining written description with the Wands factors for determining
enablement to come up with a singular test that focuses on the kind of
experimentation a PHOSITA would conduct in view of a particular disclosure. In
the context of biotechnology and antibody-based therapeutics in particular, the
Federal Circuit should return to its own decision in Noelle and integrate their
“fully characterized antigen”317 test as one of the possible routes patentees can use
to comply with the written description requirement. This flexible approach would
level the playing field for biotechnology and pharmaceutical innovations and such
flexible tests could also factor in other tests, including the “representative number
of examples” test.
The academic exercise of suggesting ways to fix 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) aside,
recent decisions provide some guidance regarding the likelihood of any change in
direction from the courts. Based on the Amgen and Idenix decisions from 2021,318
one can extrapolate that broad functional genus claims are all but worthless for
at least some time to come. The original Amgen panel’s full throttle defense of
their heightened enablement standard and denying Amgen’s rehearing request as
“non-precedential” indicates the Federal Circuit is unlikely to change its position
on their heightened enablement bar in the near term. This coupled with the fact
that Idenix petition for certiorari was also recently denied by the Supreme Court,
also is indicative of no changes in law being forthcoming from the courts.
Therefore, from a practical perspective, patentees would be well advised to avoid
functional genus claims and instead focus on describing small molecules in
structural terms. If functional language is used in genus claims, it is now
advisable to provide multiple specific examples in the patent application to
support the scope of the patent claim.
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